Abstract
It is argued that, if Armstrong is correct and truthmakers necessitate the truths they make true, then the truthmakers must include facts about the meanings of the words used to express those truths, and nominalism apparently results. This conclusion, no doubt unpalatable to Armstrong, is, it is claimed, the result of his having failed to distinguish sufficiently the meanings of words and the properties of things.
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References
Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Truth and truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heil, J. (2006). The legacy of linguisticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(2), 233–244.
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Green, K. Necessitating Nominalism. Acta Anal 24, 193–196 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0057-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0057-1