Abstract
A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The result is a much simpler and more plausible version of the quandary view.
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References
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Wright’s papers on vagueness have been at the centre of the vagueness debate for over thirty years. They are a huge inspiration for my own work and so it’s a great pleasure to comment on Wright’s quandary theory.
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Greenough, P. On what it is to be in a quandary. Synthese 171, 399–408 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9317-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9317-7