Abstract
The paper points out that in dynamic games a player may be better-off if other players do not know his choice of strategy. That is, a player may benefit by not revealing (or not pre-determining) the choice of his action in an information set he (thereby) hopes will not be reached. He would be better-off by exercising his ``right to remain silent'' if he believes –- as the empirical evidence shows –- that players display aversion to ``Knightian uncertainty''. In this case, a player who behaves strategically, may wish to avoid revealing his strategy. This is true under various interpretations of the notion of ``strategy profiles''.
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Greenberg, J. The Right to Remain Silent. Theory and Decision 48, 193–204 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005205630723
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005205630723