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Debating Forgiveness: A Reply to My Critics

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Abstract

In this essay I offer a detailed reply to three critics (whose commentaries are included in this issue of Philosophia) of my Forgiveness: a Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). The topics explored include the nature and limits of forgiveness; its unconditional or conditional character; the problem of distinguishing between central and marginal cases; the analysis of political apology; and questions of philosophical methodology.

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Notes

  1. In an effort to sort out these broader historical issues further, I am co-editing a volume with David Konstan on Greek and Roman notions of forgiveness as well as the transition to Christian and Judaic notions. Tentatively entitled Ancient Forgiveness: Classical, Judaic, and Christian, the volume is under contract at Cambridge University Press.

  2. For an excellent systematic philosophical account of apology, see Smith (2008).

  3. For an account of the event referred to, see Kraybill et al. (2007). On criticisms of the Amish’s response to the murder of their children, see p. 57.

  4. Kraybill et al. (2007), p. 89.

  5. See Murphy (2003), p. 36. Murphy also expresses there his doubts that the Christian tradition unequivocally endorses unconditional forgiveness (cf. chap. 8). On the reason Christ gives as turning forgiveness into excuse, see Murphy’s remarks in Murphy and Hampton (1998), p. 20. For more detailed discussion, see Bash (2007).

  6. For Butler’s influential views on anger (resentment) and forgiveness, see The Works of Joseph Butler, D.C.L., ed. W. E. Gladstone, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896); vol. II, Sermon VIII (“Upon Resentment”), pp. 136–149 (on anger as reactive, see in particular pp. 139–142), and Sermon IX (“Upon Forgiveness of Injuries”), pp. 150–167. See Strawson (1980). Strawson refers to reactive attitudes such as resentment and forgiveness as “. . . essentially reactions to the quality of others’ wills towards us, as manifested in their behaviour: to their good or ill will or indifference or lack of concern. Thus resentment, or what I have called resentment, is a reaction to injury or indifference” (p. 14).

  7. I did not provide much argument in the book to that effect. I have taken a stab at doing so in “The Virtues and Vices of Moral Anger and Revenge,” delivered as part of an American Philosophical Association panel on “Transitional Justice, Reconciliation, Identity, and Memory,” Eastern Division Meeting, Dec. 28, 2009.

  8. Butler, ibid, “Upon Resentment,” pp. 145–146; “Upon Forgiveness,” pp. 161–162.

  9. In the ACPA exchange referred to in the note appended to the start of this essay, I have offered a few thoughts about the relation between secular and religious views. For some further discussion, see my exchange with Father W. Meninger, “Forgiveness and Apology: What, When, Why?” Tikkun March/April 2008, pp. 21–26; 62–64 (with a reply by Meninger, my reply to him, and Meninger’s response to that reply). Also available online at http://www.tikkun.org/article.php?story=forgiveness_articles

References

  • Bash, A. (2007). Forgiveness and Christian ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Butler, J. (1896). The works of Joseph Butler, D.C.L. W. E. Gladstone (Ed.), 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Kraybill, D. B., Nolt, S. M., & Weaver-Zercher, D. L. (2007). Amish grace: How forgiveness transcended tragedy. San Francisco: J. Wiley & Sons.

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  • Murphy, J. (2003). Getting even: Forgiveness and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Murphy, J. G., & Hampton, J. (1998). Forgiveness and mercy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Smith, N. (2008). I was wrong: The meanings of apologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Strawson, P. F. (1980). Freedom and resentment. In Freedom and resentment and other essays (pp. 1–25). New York: Methuen.

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Correspondence to Charles L. Griswold.

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An earlier draft of this reply was offered at an “author meets critics” session of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting (March 20, 2008). The topic was my Forgiveness: a Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). There is partial overlap between this reply and that published (in response to two other critics) in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 82 (2008): 303–313. My references here to Moody-Adams (“MMA”), Morton, and Wettstein (“HW”) advert to their contributions to the present exchange.

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Griswold, C.L. Debating Forgiveness: A Reply to My Critics. Philosophia 38, 457–473 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9245-x

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