Abstract
In their Minds and Machines essay How would you know if you synthesized a Thinking Thing? (Kary & Mahner, Minds and Machines, 12(1), 61–86, 2002), Kary and Mahner have chosen to occupy a high ground of materialism and empiricism from which to attack the philosophical and methodological positions of believers in artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life (AL). In this review I discuss some of their main arguments as well as their philosophical foundations. Their central argument: ‘AI is Platonism’, which is based on a particular interpretation of the notion of ‘definition’ and used as a critique against AI, can be counter criticized from two directions: first, Anti-Platonism is not a necessary precondition for criticizing AI, because outspoken Platonist criticism against AI is already known (Penrose, The emperor’s new mind (with a foreword by M. Gardner), 1989). Second, even in case that AI would essentially be ‘Platonism’ this would not be a sufficient argument for proving AI wrong. In my counter criticism I assume a more or less Popperian position by emphasizing the openness of the future: Not by quasi-Scholastic arguments (like Kary and Mahner’s), but only after being confronted with a novel ‘thinking thing’ by future AI engineers we can start to analyze its particular properties (Let me use a history analogon to illustrate my position: In the 19th century, mechanized aviation was widely regarded impossible—only natural organisms (such as birds or bees) could fly, and any science of aerodynamics or aviation did not exist. Only after some non-scientific technicians had confronted their astonished fellows with the first (obviously) flying machine the science of ‘Artificial Aviation’ came into existence, motivated by the need for understanding and mastering that challenging and puzzling new phenomenon).
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Notes
Though Searle also touches on issues such as ‘feeling pain’ which points into the direction of type (β).
The limited space available to this kind of review articles does, of course, not allow for a comprehensive treatment of all these matters in all detail. However I may hope that a wider audience of scholars, more able than myself, might pick up some of my hints in order to continue the discussion of these interesting yet largely unsolved problems.
All page indications of the form (p. XY) in this section refer to Kary and Mahner (2002). Text printed in Italics in this section indicates direct quotations from Kary and Mahner (2002); those text parts are generally not printed in Italics in the original text (Kary and Mahner 2002). In some cases I have shortened quotations which is indicated as usual by dots in brackets ‘(…)’.
Which has a variety of meanings and applications in various contexts (Thiel 1992/1989).
This is actually the same notion of ‘Functionalism’ as the one found in Sober’s critique of AL (Sober 1992).
Note the structural similarity of this argument with Gottlob Frege’s argument against the creation of numbers like \(\sqrt{-1}\) by (mis)using abstract concepts (Begriffe) as concrete entities (Gegenstände) in the Formalists’ interpretation of Mathematics (Frege 1884).
Note that such a notion of ‘definition’ differs significantly from other notions of ‘definition’ such as (for example) Frege’s explication according to which definitions do not contribute anything to knowledge: they are just declarative abbreviations which can always be eliminated (Frege 1893, 1903).
It is interesting to compare Kary and Mahner’s argument—AI cannot contribute anything to the science of mind—with Frege’s structurally similar argument (against the Psychologists of the 19th century) that Psychology could never contribute anything to the science of logic (Frege 1893). Note however that Frege, whom I mention here quite often, was not a materialist: his position of ‘objective idealism’ is, indeed, related to the position of mathematical Platonism.
It is interesting to compare the structure of this argument—there would be no properties on their own without things to which they belong—with Frege’s argument that in the ‘universe of thoughts’ (Gedankenreich) there would be no concepts (Begriffe) on their own (which can only occur attached to thoughts (Frege 1918)) in the context of the dispute about the existence of universals.
Note that we ourselves must be intelligent, too, in order to determine whether or not somebody else is intelligent or stupid. It seems impossible to define intelligence without being intelligent already: Kary and Mahner’s problem is thus related to the notorious hermeneutic circle problem (Gadamer 1960).
I regard it as rather unimportant that arguments are brought forward by myself; it is only important that arguments are brought forward at all.
Following the German tradition of literature studies I do not use the Latin name ‘Plato’ but the direct transcription ‘Platon’ from the Greek original, \(\Pi\lambda\alpha\tau\ \!{\mit o}\nu.\)
In that part of the dialog, Sokrates and Simmias are disputing the question whether or not the soul is ‘like the tuning of the strings of a harp’.
Note that Gödel is said (AEIOU Dictionary 2007) to have been associated with the Wiener Kreis of philosophers around Carnap, Reichenbach et al., the distinctly anti metaphysical and neo Positivist position of whom appears in some contrast to Penrose’s characterization of Gödel as ‘Platonist’; Penrose does not discuss this question any further.
Note how the above-mentioned similarity between the positions of metamathematical formalism and AI operationalism encourages the usage of Gödel’s eventually anti-formalist position in an anti-operationalist argument.
Of course there are other aspects of intelligence which the Turing Test does not test—as there are other aspects of medication which the clinical ‘blind’ test cannot ‘see’.
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Acknowledgements
The German Gesellschaft zur wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung von Parawissenschaften has drawn my attention to Kary and Mahner’s original article. Martin Mahner himself provided me with a copy of that article, about which I had some inspiring discussions with Helko Lehmann at the University of Southampton, England, several years ago. Many thanks to James Fetzer and James Moor, editors of this journal, as well as to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the various earlier drafts of this article. Fritz-Gregor Herrmann at the University of Swansea, Wales, provided valuable background advice on ‘what is Platonism’. David Sherman at the LaBRI research laboratories in Bordeaux, France, helped me with the English language. The ladies Astrid Huizer and Jolanda Voogd at Springer Verlag’s Dutch office in Dordrecht, The Netherlands, managed the (re-) submission and review process of the draft manuscripts both friendly and kindly as well as professionally and efficiently.
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Gruner, S. Comments on ‘How Would You Know If You Synthesized A Thinking Thing’. Minds & Machines 18, 107–120 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-007-9087-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-007-9087-x