Abstract
Response-dependence theses are usually formulated in terms of a priori true biconditionals of roughly the form ‘something, x, falls under the concept ‘F’ ↔ x would elicit response R from subjects S under conditions C’. Such formulations are vulnerable to conditional fallacy problems; counterexamples threaten whenever the C-conditions’ coming to obtain might alter the object with respect to F. Crispin Wright has suggested that such problems can be avoided by placing the C-conditions in a proviso. This ensures that any changes triggered by the C-conditions’ coming to obtain will be irrelevant to the truth of the biconditional. I argue that this move leaves the equations vulnerable to counterexamples of a slightly different kind: Cases where the change is triggered, not by the C-conditions’ coming to obtain, but by the response. I consider two ways to resist these counterexamples, and argue that both are insufficient. The upshot is a challenge that must be met if provisoed biconditionals are to serve their purpose.
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Notes
Wright imposes two further conditions—the independence and extremal conditions—which we can bracket for current purposes. The objections under consideration here challenge what is usually regarded as a necessary condition for response-dependence: the a priori truth of suitable biconditionals. Any additions needed to get from this to sufficient conditions will not help against the current challenge. (Thanks to Carsten Hansen for pressing me on this point.)
See Shope 1978 and Bonevac et al. 2006 for discussion of conditional fallacy problems in general. The classics on finkish dispositions as counterexamples to the conditional analysis of dispositions are Martin 1994 and Lewis 1997. For conditional fallacy problems for response-dependence theses, see Johnston 1993, pp. 131–134; Wright 1992, pp. 117–120; and Blackburn 1993, pp. 263–267.
Wright 1992, p. 119. Though Wright doesn’t say so, this conditional is best interpreted as a (non-vacuously true) subjunctive conditional. It can’t be a material conditional; otherwise, (4) would be true a priori for any domain where idealisations in the C-conditions make it a priori that the C-conditions are never in fact met, and so all such domains would automatically qualify as response-dependent (Thanks to Wlodek Rabinowicz for the latter point, and to Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen for a related one.).
Do C-conditions for judging the colour of unexposed photosensitive paper really include daylight? I think not. This thought might serve as starting point for a different way to resist the counterexamples (briefly explored in Gundersen 2006). This and other alternative defences deserve separate consideration, but here I focus exclusively on Wright’s provisional equations strategy.
I argue in Gundersen 2006 that both strategies need support from substantial extra assumptions, and explore some additions and alternatives.
References
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Lars Gundersen and Crispin Wright for much inspiring discussion on response-dependence and conditional fallacy problems, to Alex Miller for valuable feedback and encouragement to write this paper, and to Timothy Chan and Lars Gundersen for helpful comments on a draft. Thanks also to audiences at Aarhus University, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, and the Joint Session 2009, in particular to Barry Smith and to Wlodek Rabinovicz (who suggested the same solution to the problem as I favour).
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Gundersen, E.B. The chameleon’s revenge. Philos Stud 153, 435–441 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9519-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9519-y