Abstract
Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theory gives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, The Psychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Egan argues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. This paper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations. Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decision theory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.
Notes
References
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Frank Arntzenius, John Cantwell, Sven Ove Hansson, Martin Peterson, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Tor Sandqvist, and two anonymous referees for Erkenntnis.
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Gustafsson, J.E. A Note in Defence of Ratificationism. Erkenn 75, 147–150 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9267-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9267-6