Abstract
Richard Swinburne’s argument in The Existence of God discusses many probabilities, ultimately concluding that God probably exists. Swinburne gives exact values to almost none of these probabilities. I attempted to assign values to the probabilities that met that weak condition that they could be correct. In this paper, I first present a brief outline of Swinburne’s argument in The Existence of God. I then present the problems I encountered in Swinburne’s argument, specifically problems that interfered with my attempt to arrive at values for the probabilities discussed by Swinburne. Finally, I suggest that Swinburne’s argument would be more persuasive if he assigned exact values to his probabilities.
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Notes
For example, I agree with Swinburne (2004, 54) that some phenomena do not have scientific explanations because, put loosely, they are too big, too odd, or both. There are, of course, claims of Swinburne’s that are contentious. For example, Swinburne works with objective probabilities; though supported in Carnap’s Logical Foundations of Probability, such probabilities have largely fallen out of favor. Hasker (2002, 257) notes this point. For a general discussion of the nature of such probabilities see, e.g., Glymour (1980) and Earman (1992). For Swinburne’s defense of an objective, or logical, conception of probability see (2004, ch. 3) and (2001, ch. 3).
Note that Swinburne also suggests that the value might be 1/3.
There is debate as to whether or not simplicity plays a role in determining prior probability. See, e.g., Glymour (1980) and Horwich (1982) for differing views on this issue. In terms of Swinburne’s argument specifically, O’Hear (1984, 114–117) and Marenco (1988) argue against Swinburne’s use of simplicity in determining prior probabilities. Swinburne’s defense can be found in (1997), (2001, especially 99–102), and (2004, especially 52–72).
Given that something exists. See Swinburne (2004, 336).
See footnote 3. My argument still succeeds assuming the value is 1/3.
Assuming, with Swinburne, that God is simpler than the wooden block and that the universe is more complex than the small light wooden block.
Swinburne does not explicitly argue that P(e|k) is low, but it follows from his emphasis on simplicity to determine intrinsic probabilities.
There seems also to be something worrisome about the overall structure of Swinburne’s argument. Swinburne claims that P(e|h&k)=1/2 in chapter 6 of The Existence of God. He also has claimed that God is the simplest hypothesis by chapter 6, meaning that P(h|k) > P(e|k), from which it follows that P(h|k)/P(e|k) > 1. Recall Bayes’s Theorem: \( {\text{P}}\left( {{\text{h}}\left| {{\text{e}}\& {\text{k}}} \right.} \right) = {{{\text{P}}\left( {{\text{e}}\left| {{\text{h}}\& {\text{k}}} \right.} \right){\text{P}}\left( {{\text{h}}\left| {\text{k}} \right.} \right)} \mathord{\left/{\vphantom {{{\text{P}}\left( {{\text{e}}\left| {{\text{h}}\& {\text{k}}} \right.} \right){\text{P}}\left( {{\text{h}}\left| {\text{k}} \right.} \right)} {{\text{P}}\left( {{\text{e}}\left| {\text{k}} \right.} \right)}}} \right.} {{\text{P}}\left( {{\text{e}}\left| {\text{k}} \right.} \right)}} \). So by chapter 6 Swinburne has established that P(h|e&k) equals 1/2 times something greater than 1, which implies that P(h|e&k) > 1/2, which is Swinburne’s ultimate conclusion. It seems striking both that Swinburne has accomplished so much by chapter 6, and that he neglects to inform the reader that his ultimate conclusion has been attained. I believe that these considerations add force to the argument that Swinburne has overstated the value of P(e|h&k), P(h|k), or both.
That this equation must hold follows from Swinburne’s discussion on pages 111–112 and 339–340 of The Existence of God. Swinburne writes, “...where h, h1, h2, h3, etc. are such that one and only one such theory must be true.” Note that over many informal discussions, four people have held that this equation must hold and two have held that it does not; those who maintained that the equation does not hold seemed to miss the important point that the various h’s only range over explanations, and not states of the universe. But another reason for Swinburne to provide an example of exact values (that could make his argument succeed) is that providing such values would make clear whether or not certain equations and logical relations are meant to hold.
Note that Gutenson (1997), replying to the first edition of The Existence of God, argued that P(h|k) > 1/2. However, I believe his argument fails as he mistakenly claims that there is only one rival to theism, namely brute fact. Also recall Swinburne’s writing in the second edition of The Existence of God that P(h|k) might be “very small.”
Of course, the 0.999 can be given a different value, but it will still be a value very close to 1.
With one value either/or, as discussed.
This list is not meant to be minimal, that is, many probabilities on this list can be calculated from others.
References
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Gwiazda, J. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, and Exact Numerical Values. Philosophia 38, 357–363 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9216-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9216-2