Philosophy East and West

As the title Ritual and Religion in the Xunzi accurately suggests, this collection of essays edited by T. C. Kline III and Justin Tiwald addresses Xunzi’s perspective on ritual and religion. Some of the essays are new, others are have been published previously. As a whole, the book strives to portray Xunzi as a religious philosopher, and to elucidate his potential contribution to the understanding of religion and ritual. Although there are a variety of views presented, Xunzi is generally characterized as renovating and reinterpreting religion, rather than denouncing it, as he has sometimes been interpreted.

After an introduction, the first chapter is Edward J. Machle’s seminal 1976 essay “Xunzi as a Religious Philosopher,” in which Machle challenges the then-dominant notion that Xunzi was an antireligious philosopher. As Machle points out, both Neo-Confucians, who followed Mencius in affirming the goodness of human nature, and twentieth-century rationality-minded Confucians had incentives for misreading Xunzi as antireligious — the former to reject him, the latter to embrace him. [End Page 676]

Machle lists seven textual grounds for an antireligious interpretation of Xunzi, of which I will mention four: (1) his critique of superstition, (2) his seemingly dismissive attitude toward spirits, (3) his statement suggesting that religious rituals are merely ornamental, and (4) his seemingly naturalistic view of tian. Machle dismisses most of the seven reasons rather quickly, effectively leaving him with two (or three, depending on how you count) to deal with in detail, namely Xunzi’s “critiques of superstition (including beliefs in spirits) and his ‘naturalistic’ view of nature” (p. 25). In his treatment of these issues, Machle points out that Xunzi’s attack on superstition need not be considered antireligious (p. 25), and that while Xunzi had a negative view of gui (spooks), he had a positive view of shen (spirits). In the end, Machle has made a persuasive case that rather than rejecting religion Xunzi was trying to renovate it.

The next chapter, “A Happy Symmetry: Xunzi’s Ecological Ethic,” is a significantly revised version of P. J. Ivanhoe’s 1991 essay, originally carrying the subtitle “Xunzi’s Ethical Thought.” Ivanhoe highlights an ecological aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy, in which Xunzi is described as having provided a formula for achieving “a happy symmetry” that “balances human needs and desires with the capacities, limitations, and needs of the non-human realm” (p. 50). This balance is thought to make possible “universal harmony and flourishing” (p. 49), an achievement so significant that the dao that makes it possible becomes “worthy of profound respect and complete devotion” (p. 45; cf. p. 52). And this, Ivanhoe suggests, amounts to “religious reverence for the Way” (p. 44).

I happen to have a long-standing difference of opinion with Ivanhoe regarding one aspect of his interpretation of Xunzi that is prominent in this essay, namely the suggestion that Xunzi thought there was a uniquely best, fundamentally unchanging way. Regardless, the point of Ivanhoe’s essay can be sustained even without this supposition. The point, as I would put it, is this: it is possible for human beings to “cooperate with” the heavens and the earth in a way that is satisfying from all perspectives (p. 44).

In chapter 3, Robert C. Neville interprets Xunzi’s ritual theory in terms of semiotics. He takes li (ritual) broadly “to encompass all conventions, all learned signs and sign-shaped behaviors” (p. 65). Comparing ritual to formal dance steps, Neville points out that, given their inherent vagueness, “each performer has to make them specific to individuated actions” (p. 68). He combines these considerations with the relation between ritual and desire, and how ritual functions to facilitate personal integration as well as higher-level integration. While there are costs involved in these various levels of integration, Neville argues, they result in richer levels of “personal...