Abstract
I start by using “Frankfurt-type” examples to cast preliminary doubt on the “Objective View” - that one is blameworthy for an action only if that action is objectively wrong, and follow by providing further arguments against this view. Then I sketch a replacement for the Objective View whose core is that one is to blame for performing an action, A, only if one has the belief that it is morally wrong for one to do A, and this belief plays an appropriate role in the etiology of one's A-ing. I next defend this core against recently advanced objections and then show how it helps with defusing a skeptical challenge from the direction of causal determinism against blameworthiness. Finally, I exploit the core to isolate an analogous epistemic core for nonmoral but “normative” varieties of blameworthiness.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Audi, R.: 1995, ‘Acting From Virtue’, Mind 104, 49–471.
Bratman, M. E.: 1987, Intension, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Cocking, D. and J. Oakley: 1994, ‘Consequentialism, Moral Responsibility, and the Intention/ Foresight Distinction’, Utilities 6, 201–216.
Copp, D.: 1997, ‘The Ring of Gyges: On the Unity of Practical Reason’, Social Philosophy and Policy, forthcoming.
Copp, D.: n.d., ‘Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility’, Nous, forthcoming.
Davidson, D.: 1963, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Journal of Philosophy 60, 685–700.
Driver, J.: 1992, ‘The Suberogatory’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70, 286–295.
Feldman, F.: 1986, Doing Best We Can, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht.
Fields, L.: 1994, ‘Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness’, Philosophy 69, 397–415.
Fischer, J. M.: 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass.
Foot, P.: 1978,‘Are Moral Considerations Overriding?’ in Virtues and Vices, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 181–188.
Frankfurt, H. G.: 1994, ‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love’, in Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (eds.), Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 433–447.
Frankfurt, H. G.: 1969, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66, 828–839.
Goldman, A.: 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Haji, I.: 1997a, ‘An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 523–544.
Haji, I.: 1997b, ‘The Supererogatory, the Suberogatory, and Appraisability’, manuscript.
Haji, I.: 1997c, Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities, Oxford University Press, New York.
Haji, I.: n.d., ‘On Being Blameworthy for the Thoughts of One's Dream Self’, in G. B. Matthews (ed.), The Augustinian Tradition, University of California Press, Berkeley, forthcoming.
Kane, R.: 1989, ‘Two Kinds of Incompatibilism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, 219–254.
McNamara, P.: 1996, ‘Making Room for Going Beyond the Call’, Mind 105, 415–50.
Mele, A.: 1996, ‘Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios’, Philosophical Topics.
Mele, A.: 1992, Springs of Action, Oxford University Press, New York.
Mele, A.: 1987, Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, and Self-Control, Oxford University Press, New York.
Mellema, G.: 1991, Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation and Offence, State University Press of New York, Albany.
Mill, J. S.: 1989, Utilitarianism, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York.
Pereboom, D.: 1995, ‘Determinism al Dente’, Nous 29, 21–45.
Slote, M.: 1983, ‘Admirable Immorality’, in Goods and Virtues, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 77–107.
Slote, M.: 1982, ‘Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem’, Journal of Philosophy 79, 5–24.
Smith, H. M.: 1991, ‘Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit’, Ethics 101, 279–303.
Stocker, M.: 1990, Plural and Conflicting Values, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
van Inwagen, P.: 1983, An Essay on Free Will, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Watson, G.: 1975, ‘Free Agency’, Journal of Philosophy 72, 205–220.
Widerker, D.: 1995, ‘Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities’, The Philosophical Review 104, 247–261.
Widerker, D.: 1991, ‘Frankfurt on ‘Ought Implies Can’ and Alternative Possibilities’, Analysis 51, 222–224.
Williams, B.: 1976, ‘Moral Luck’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, sup. vol., 115–135.
Zimmerman, M. J.: 1996, The Concept of Moral Obligation, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Zimmerman, M. J.: 1988, An Essay on Moral Responsibility, Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa, New Jersey.
Zimmerman, M. J.: 1987, ‘Remote Obligation’, American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 199–205.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Haji, I. Frankfurt-Pairs and Varieties of Blameworthiness: Epistemic Morals. Erkenntnis 47, 351–377 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005348810476
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005348810476