Abstract
Discussion regarding education’s aims, especially its ultimate aims, is a key topic in the philosophy of education. These aims or values play a pivotal role in regulating and structuring moral and other types of normative education. We outline two plausible strategies to identify and justify education’s ultimate aims. The first associates these aims with a normative standpoint, such as the moral, prudential, or aesthetic, which is overriding, in a sense of ‘overriding’ to be explained. The second associates education’s ultimate aims with the intrinsic value of personal well-being. We advance reasons to doubt that these strategies are successful. The shortcomings of these strategies impute yet further urgency to the issue of how we are to ascertain and validate education’s ultimate aims.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
We are very grateful to three anonymous referees for the Studies in Philosophy and Education for their helpful comments and suggestions on the penultimate version of this paper.
A useful collection of essays on educational aims is Marples (1999).
In Rationality Redeemed? Siegel still endorses the view “that the fostering of rationality and critical thinking is the central aim, and the overriding ideal, of education” (Siegel (1997), p. 2) while believing “that this ideal is by far the one most widely advocated in the history of philosophy of education, from Plato to Dewey and beyond” (p. 189, note 1).
On this central Humean thesis see Cuypers (2004).
Unlike “sensory” pleasure, which is a sensory state or sensation, “attitudinal” pleasure is the propositional attitude of taking pleasure in something. See, note 16.
“Plain ought” is a term Feldman introduces in his discussion of overridingness. See Feldman (1986), pp. 212–215.
Copp plausibly suggests that Reason would have the properties of “comprehensiveness” and “supremacy.” He explains that Reason would take the verdicts given by all the special standpoints in any situation where various obligations conflict, “evaluate these verdicts without any question-begging; and… produce an overall verdict as to what the agent is to do… [Reason] would be ‘comprehensive’” (1997, p. 94). Further, he says that Reason would be the normatively most important standard for evaluating such verdicts and for the choice of how to act: “Hence, an agent ought simpliciter to comply with its overall verdict…[Reason] would be ‘supreme’” (1997, pp. 94–95).
See, for example, Copp (1997).
Here, we borrow from Haji (2002), pp. 234–237.
Slote (1983), p. 86.
Hurka (2006) has an instructive survey of these axiologies.
See Feldman (2004) on this attitudinal hedonistic account.
The general problem remains when one opts for a desire-fulfilment theory or an objective list theory. On desire-fulfiment theories, it is satisfaction or frustration of intrinsic desires that contribute to well-being. But there is no a priori reason why a life of self-interest should more satisfy one’s intrinsic desires, while a moral live should more frustrate them. The intrinsic desire for friendship, for instance, might systematically be frustrated by one’s self-interested projects, whereas the intrinsic desire for self-fulfilment might amply be satisfied by one’s dedication to a moral cause. On objective list theories, it is possession of goods such as knowledge, beauty, freedom, love, power, and so on that contribute to well-being. But a well documented problem with this view concerns justification of the items on the list.
See, for example, pertinent articles in the Journal of Happiness Studies.
References
Brighouse, H. (2006). On education. London: Routledge.
Copp, D. (1997). The ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the unity of reason. In A. F. Paul, F. D. Miller Jr, & J. Paul (Eds.), Self-Interest (pp. 86–106). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cuypers, S. E. (2004). Critical thinking, autonomy, and practical reason. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 38, 75–90.
Egéa-Kuehne, D. (2008). Levinas and education. At the intersection of faith and reason. New York: Routledge.
Feldman, F. (1986). Doing the best we can. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Feldman, F. (2004). Pleasure and the good life. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Foot, P. (1972). Are Moral Considerations Overriding? In P. Foot (Ed.), Virtues and vices (pp. 157–173). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
Haji, I. (1998). On morality’s dethronement. Philosophical Papers, 27, 161–180.
Haji, I. (2002). Deontic morality and control. Cambridge: University Press.
Hurka, T. (2006). Value theory. In D. Copp (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (pp. 357–379). Oxford: University Press.
Marples, R. (Ed.). (1999). The aims of education. London: Routledge.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Siegel, H. (1988). Educating reason. Rationality, critical thinking, and education. New York: Routledge.
Siegel, H. (1997). Rationality redeemed? further dialogues on an educational ideal. New York: Routledge.
Slote, M. (1983). Admirable immorality. In M. Slote (Ed.), Goods and virtues (pp. 77–107). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Standish, P. (1999). Education without aims? In R. Marples (Ed.), The aims of education (pp. 35–49). London: Routledge.
Standish, P. (2003). The nature and purposes of education. In R. Curren (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of education (pp. 221–231). Oxford: Blackwell.
Todd, S. (2003). Special issue on Levinas and education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 22, 1–68.
White, J. (1999). In defence of liberal aims in education. In R. Marples (Ed.), The aims of education (pp. 185–200). London: Routledge.
Willaims, B. (1981). Moral luck. In B. Willaims (Ed.), Moral luck (pp. 20–39). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. (1976). Persons, character and morality. In A. Oksenberg Rorty (Ed.), The identities of persons (pp. 197–216). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wolf, S. (1982). Moral Saints. The Journal of Philosophy, 19, 419–439.
Zimmerman, M. J. (2001). The nature of intrinsic value. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Haji, I., Cuypers, S.E. Ultimate Educational Aims, Overridingness, and Personal Well-being. Stud Philos Educ 30, 543–556 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-011-9238-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-011-9238-7