Abstract
The present paper poses a new problem for moral luck. Defenders of moral luck uncritically rely on a broader theory of luck known as the control theory or the lack of control theory. However, there are are two other analyses of luck in the literature that dominate discussion in epistemology, namely the probability and modal theories. However, moral luck is nonexistent under the probability and modal accounts, but the control theory cannot explain epistemic luck. While some have posited that “luck” is ambiguous, so that one theory of luck is operative with epistemic luck and a different theory works for moral luck, there are both semantic and philosophical reasons to reject luck ambiguity. Defenders of moral luck must engage with the broader literature on luck and either provide a comprehensive defense of the control theory or concede that moral luck is not a genuine thing in its own right.
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Notes
For further discussion of necessary truths and their implications for theories of luck, see Hales (2015).
On Bonnard’s perfectionism, see Grande (2009).
God’s grace was short-lived in any event; Bradford was later burned at the stake for heresy.
Zagzebski (1994) argues that this is in fact inevitable.
See Church (2013) for a recent defense.
Carter (2015) is the exception that proves the rule. He’s willing to let knowledge be compatible with some luck, just so long as it isn’t too much.
See Ballantyne (2014) for a fuller discussion. All I mean by a “fundamental” account of luck in this context is the genus-level distinctions among the probability, modal, and control views, not the species-level distinctions among constitutive, outcome, circumstantial, brute, and option luck.
Wegner (2002) chapter 1 has a nice discussion of many of these.
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Acknowledgments
This paper was first written as a visiting professorial fellow at the Eidyn Research Centre in the University of Edinburgh. I am tremendously grateful for their hospitality, fellowship, and critical acumen, especially Duncan Pritchard, Sandy Goldberg, and J. Adam Carter. I also appreciate the helpful comments from a referee for Philosophical Studies.
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Hales, S.D. A problem for moral luck. Philos Stud 172, 2385–2403 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0417-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0417-6