Abstract
This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed.
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Notes
At least, let us here grant this widely shared intuition; it is of little importance for the purpose of this paper.
Here is an alternative case concerning persons rather than inanimate objects such as statues, inspired by Parfit’s reasoning in his (1971, pp. 13 and 24–25): A person p develops Alzheimer’s and his mental life starts to deteriorate. Suppose we ask “Is the senile person p* that exists some years later the same person as the person p who first developed Alzheimer’s?”, and that we do not know how to answer this question. Suppose we reason that if we make the persistence conditions associated with the person-concept stringent (requiring a very high degree of psychological connectedness), the answer is “no” (p* not being p but merely one of p’s “descendent selves”); but that if we make them tolerant (requiring only a non-branching chain of psychological continuity), the answer is “yes”. See also Nozick (1981, p. 69), Johnston (1989) and Unger (1990, pp. 66, 168–169, 239, and 257) for suggestions or explicit claims that the persistence through time of persons is (sometimes, at least) a matter of convention. For rejections of conventional persistence of persons, see Olson (1997) and Merricks (2001b). For suggestions or explicit claims that the persistence through time of inanimate physical objects is (sometimes, at least) a matter of convention, see Nozick (ibid., pp. 33–34), Sider (2001, p. 207), Noonan (2003, p. 18) and Thomasson (2007, pp. 55–59). It is not always clear, however, just how “deep” the proponents of conventional persistence take the conventionality at issue to be, how worldly as opposed to wordy it is. Consider this Nozick quote: “it is different, though, with persons [as compared to inanimate objects], and especially with ourselves; we are not willing to think that whether something is us can be a matter of (somewhat arbitrary) decision or stipulation” (ibid., p. 34). As Nozick formulates the matter here, the conventionality at issue would seem to be quite deep and worldly—otherwise, why would he say that we are bothered by such conventionality, in relation to ourselves, at least? Yet, does Nozick really wish to hold that the conventionality he endorses for both animate and inanimate objects (pp. 34 and 69) is of such a far-reaching kind? I think his theory, like several of those referred to above, is rather obscure in this respect. One aim of this paper is consequently to distinguish clearly between distinct kinds of conventionality, and to show that “conventional persistence” is sensible only if a very shallow and wordy kind of conventionality is at issue—irrespective of whether we are concerned with inanimate or animate objects. My arguments here will be perfectly general.
By objects that are traditionally regarded as “social constructs” I mean, roughly, such objects of traditional social ontology as can be found, e.g., in Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality (1995, esp. pp. 43–51)—i.e. “objects” such as states, governments and legal courts. It can be questioned whether they, in contrast to their physical bases, really are out there. If the reader thinks, as I do not, that statues should be included in this category, I ask her or him to substitute a more traditional “physical” object for the statue in the introductory example.
Of course, the definition is constrained by earlier definitions of the expression, such as the one made in terms of the distance between two fine scratches on a platinum-iridium bar stored under controlled conditions in Sèvres in France, in conformity with the wish to have some continuity in the meaning of the expression. Also, the definition is not arbitrary in that there are practical reasons for exploiting the speed of light in a vacuum in the definition (if one wants the expression to pick out a stable unit length), since the speed of light in a vacuum is a constant quantity. But it is nevertheless true that we could have decided to let the expression “1 m” stand for something completely different, if we so wished.
That is, independently of us in the sense at issue. We can make, say, a piece of rubber band longer by pulling it physically. And we could, of course, conventionally issue a law that obliges everyone to physically pull their rubber bands with the result that some rubber bands (the elastic and already rather large ones) turn out to measure 1 m. Conventions of type-2 are not intended to include scenarios of the latter kind; they are to be understood as conventions which have their effects on the world in a more abstract way, through stipulations, rather than by being mediated by ordinary concrete physical processes.
It is sometimes suggested that courts do occasionally rule (make a somewhat arbitrary decision) on the diachronic history of a thing. Merricks writes: “we often assume that the identity over time of inanimate macrophysical objects can be somewhat conventional. For example, we might, for practical purposes, leave it up to the courts to ‘decide’ a case of statue identity over time that—prior to any judicial decree—is in some sense borderline” (Merricks 2001a, p. 176). Whether courts actually do issue such verdicts I leave to the jurists to answer. I should also say that I do not think that vagueness of the relevant persistence-conditions is required if the issue of conventionality is to arise: someone might argue that we may change determinate persistence conditions too, i.e. not just specify vague ones.
Does such a strict reading of “the same” (according to which the term expresses numerical identity) mean that we cannot consistently speak of an object persisting (i.e. enduring) through change? No. It is always true to say of an enduring object o which is first, say, straight (at time t), then bent (at later time t*), that it is straight at t and bent at t*. “o is straight at t and bent at t*” may be parsed as “o is-at-t straight and is-at-t* bent”, or, if one has no scruples about time-indexed predicates as opposed to time-indexed copulas, it can be parsed as “o is straight-at-t and bent-at-t*”. The time clauses can even be deleted if the copula is read as being tenseless. Saying that an object is tenselessly straight and tenselessly bent entails no contradiction. For detailed discussions of these issues, see Hansson (2007) and Hansson Wahlberg (2010). This kind of response to the argument from Leibniz’s Law against endurance through change arguably presupposes the B-theory of time. But I do not think that this is a serious limitation or defect of it, because it is difficult to see how endurance (or any kind of persistence) can be entertained if presentism is presupposed: prima facie, given presentism there are no cross-temporal relations, and that includes the identity relation. However, it would be very interesting to see self-professed presentists develop detailed accounts of the way endurance (and other accounts of persistence) can be squeezed into the presentist framework. So far presentists like Merricks (1994) and Zimmerman (1998) have relied on rather loose and intuitive claims to the effect—vis-à-vis our object o and supposing t* is present—that o is bent but was straight. The interesting question, though, is what now makes it the case that it was o that was straight at t when t was present. Indeed, what does “t” pick out when the only time that exists is t*?.
This aspect of the theory is not always fully appreciated, and stage theorists themselves occasionally speak as if these expressions had a univocal meaning. But in order to avoid straightforward contradictions, stage theorists must hold that the expressions are ambiguous. Their fundamental position is that objects are numerically identical with instantaneous, non-persisting stages and yet are themselves persisting entities. The way out of contradiction here is to hold that “persists” expresses distinct meanings when associated with distinct sortals (cf. Sider 2001, pp. 200–201). As an account of ordinary language (disregarding the metaphysics of the theory), I think the theory is false. If I am told that my car, located at a certain time, is not located at any other time (as numerically the same entity), then on the basis of ordinary language, I would deny that “my car is a persisting entity” is true—even if I were also informed that it has car-counterparts at other times. Stage theorists may retort that even if these are not the meanings we actually give the expressions, they are the meanings we should give the expressions—i.e. by invoking new conventions of the type-1. It can be questioned, though, whether such a plethora of persistence concepts is desirable, even if objects do not endure. A person, e.g., will turn out to “persist” in a great many senses on this theory (see Hansson Wahlberg 2008).
It is possible to introduce a weak reading of “persists”, neutral between the endurance and perdurance readings, according to which “persists” simply means “is present at distinct times as numerically the same entity”, where “present” is to be read as being compatible both with being wholly present and being partly present (Lewis, 1986, p. 202). However, I will for the most part ignore this weak reading: to address it would be redundant given that the two more fully specified forms are discussed.
Again, as an analysis of ordinary language, I think this theory is false. Sortal predicates like “is a boat” we take to apply to three-dimensional entities, not to four-dimensional ones. I believe this is indicated, among other things, by the fact that sortal predicates often come associated with dispositions that cannot be ascribed to four-dimensional entities (see Hansson Wahlberg 2009a). Moreover, when we introduce names for ordinary objects, we do not (at any rate, I do not) intend to baptize four-dimensional entities, but rather intend to baptize three-dimensional ones that are wholly present in front of us. This intuition receives support from the fact that we say such things as “I dub this boat (i.e. an object with certain dispositions, i.e. a three-dimensional entity) ‘Al’”. Also, notice that if perdurantists are right (in their metaphysics and semantics), if I buy a used boat, I do not in fact buy a whole boat but only a proper part of a boat, because I do not come to own the temporal parts of the boat the former owner owned. Perdurance theorists may perhaps insist that I do in fact come to own the whole four-dimensional boat at the time of purchase—albeit in a derivative sense. I derivatively own the whole boat at the time of purchase because I non-derivatively own the temporal part of the boat located at the time of purchase (cf. the perdurance theorists’ general account of intrinsic and relational change; see e.g. Lewis 1988). But surely it is counter to ordinary ways of speaking, and legal discourse, to talk about derivative ownership of objects and non-derivative ownership of temporal parts. Again, perdurance theorists may insist that even if this is not how language actually works, it ought to do so, and therefore we should revise our conventions of the first kind! But if this is their position, they must concede that it cannot be strictly we (three-dimensional temporal parts on this view) who adopt the revised conventions, for if personal pronouns now pick out three-dimensional entities and the conventions are later changed so that they pick out four-dimensional entities, the “we” who have the first set of conventions are not identical with the “we” (4-D aggregates) who have the second set. (Of course, after the revision the 4-D aggregates are in a position to say, derivatively—i.e. in virtue of having temporal parts, at the later times, that say it primarily (in succession)—that “they” had other conventions before, derivatively—i.e. in virtue of having temporal parts at earlier times that had these conventions primarily.)
For a simple formal derivation of (x)(y)((x = y) →□(x = y)), see Kripke (1971). Conventionalists must show that there is something wrong with the derivation. (It should be noticed here that the proposition that the identity relation holds with necessity, where it holds, is compatible with the proposition that there are contingent identity statements involving non-rigid designators; again, see Kripke (1971).)
Some (e.g. McCall and Lowe 2006) would claim that the issue is nevertheless not a genuine one, because they hold that the issue is merely verbal: they think that endurance terminology is fully translatable in terms that do not involve any enduring entities but only instantaneous ones and four-dimensional aggregates thereof, and vice versa. They therefore hold: “there is ‘no fact of the matter’ as to whether we live in a 3D or 4D world. Instead, one can freely choose whether to describe it in 3D or 4D terms. Either way, it’s the same world.” (ibid., 570). I think this thesis is false (because if a endures, “a” picks out neither anything instantaneous nor anything that can be reduced to a sum or set of instantaneous things), but a full defence of this will have to wait for another occasion.
Apparently Lewis is more or less adopting Parfit’s (1971) definitions of “mental connectedness” and “quasi-mental state”.
Hawley (2001, Chap. 3) seems to adopt something like the primitivist move, however. She claims that temporal counterpart relations (in her terminology, the relations that “stick” stages together into persisting objects) are non-supervenient relations, relations that yield immanent causation, spatiotemporal continuity and similarity. But she also says that these non-supervenient relations hold naturally. The persistence of a thing is thus a natural, non-conventional matter for her. (It would appear that if the relations held conventionally, they would not be non-supervenient, for then they would supervene on human decisions.)
A similar line of reasoning can be found already in the work of David Hume (1739/1978), although he apparently denied that the phenomena yield true persistence: “[…] the objects, which are variable or interrupted, and yet are suppos’d to continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation” (p. 255).
It may be that Sider only intends to say that since a stage typically falls under several sortal concepts, associated with different persistence conditions, it is up to us to choose which of these sortals (and hence which persistence conditions) we should emphasize and utilize when describing the persistence of the stage at issue. But if this is all that is meant, then it seems to me that the issue is merely about the ambiguity of the term “persists” and how the term can be disambiguated by the specification of a certain sortal (see the discussions in Sects. 3 and 5). Such disambiguation occurs at the level of language and should not, I think, be described as a denial of the “existence of ‘deep’, ‘non-conventional’ facts about de re persistence”.
It can hardly be a convention that there is material content at the distinct times in question. The conventionality part must be that a is identical with the mereological sum, b, of the contents at the distinct times.
Prima facie the case of the repaired statue might, given the endurance metaphysics-cum-semantics, appear to involve a situation where a convention of type-1—a convention having to do with what persistence conditions should be associated with the sortal term “statue”—has worldly effects, making it also a type-2 convention: the convention might appear to rule, of certain three-dimensional objects in the world falling under the sortal term “statue”, whether or not they are related by the relation of numerical identity.
See e.g. Evans (1978).
It seems to me, however, that if one accepts Thomasson’s (2007, pp. 55–59) semantics (which apparently involves three-dimensional referents) and her specific view of persistence conditions (as involving numerical identity and as being grounded in conventional “co-application conditions” that are independent of “application conditions”), then one has indeed to accept that endurance is a matter of conventionality of type-2, in spite of her brief attempt (p. 61) to deny this.
However, things get complicated if stages are identified with the mereological sum of their spatial or qualitative parts. I neglect that issue here.
Notice a further complication here: what is there to preclude the possibility that distinct three-dimensional statues (or houses, or persons, or electrons) are governed by distinct individual metaphysical endurance conditions? Philosophers (e.g. Wiggins 2001) generally seem to presume that entities falling under the same sortal are governed by the same sortal-specific persistence conditions. But if we do not think of persistence-conditions as incorporated into our sortal concepts, that assumption needs to be motivated. Perhaps statue a can survive being transformed into a table but statue b cannot.
I want to thank Ingvar Johansson, Anna-Sofia Maurin, Hugh Mellor, Johannes Persson, Paul Robinson, Nils-Eric Sahlin, Johanna Seibt, Lena Wahlberg and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. An older and shorter version of the paper is included in Hansson Wahlberg (2009b).
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Hansson Wahlberg, T. Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?. Axiomathes 21, 507–529 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-010-9115-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-010-9115-y