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What Kripke's puzzle doesn't tell us about language, meaning or bellief

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References

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  1. University of Utah, 84112, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA

    Patricia Hanna

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  1. Patricia Hanna
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But is language the only language? Why should there not be a mode of expression through which I can talk about language in such a way that it can appear to me in co-ordination with something else? Ludwig Wittgenstein (1961).

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Hanna, P. What Kripke's puzzle doesn't tell us about language, meaning or bellief. Philosophia 31, 355–382 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02385191

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