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Folk Epistemology as Normative Social Cognition

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Abstract

Research on folk epistemology usually takes place within one of two different paradigms. The first is centered on epistemic theories or, in other words, the way people think about knowledge. The second is centered on epistemic intuitions, that is, the way people intuitively distinguish knowledge from belief. In this paper, we argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the connection between the two paradigms, as well as to the mechanisms that underlie the use of both epistemic intuitions and theories. We contend that research on folk epistemology must examine the use of both intuitions and theories in the pragmatic context of the game of giving and asking for reasons and, more generally, understand how these practices take place within the broader context of normative social cognition.

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Acknowledgements

BHV’s work was supported by a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and BD’s work by the Fonds québécois de recherche sur la société et la culture (FQRSC). We thank Joseph Heath for having us realize the importance of understanding epistemology within the context of pragmatics and normativity, as well as Christophe Heintz, Chad Horne, and an anonymous reviewer for comments on a previous version of the article.

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  1. Decision Support Services, SBR Global, Toronto, Canada

    Benoit Hardy-Vallée

  2. Department of philosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal, Case postale 8888, succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, QC, H3C 3P8, Canada

    Benoît Dubreuil

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  1. Benoit Hardy-Vallée
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Correspondence to Benoît Dubreuil.

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Hardy-Vallée, B., Dubreuil, B. Folk Epistemology as Normative Social Cognition. Rev.Phil.Psych. 1, 483–498 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0020-5

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