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Are alternative pasts plausible? A reply to Thomas Flint

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2000

WILLIAM HASKER
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Huntington College, Huntington, IN 46750

Abstract

Thomas Flint has claimed that my argument against Molinism suffers from a ‘seemingly irreparable logical gap’. He also contests a key assumption of that argument, namely that ‘something which has had causal consequences in the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past’. In reply, I show that there is no logical gap at all in the argument. And I argue that, even though Molinists have reasons, based on Molinist principles, for rejecting the assumption in question, the assumption is indeed extremely plausible. Thus, the argument creates difficulties for Molinism that are more severe than Flint is willing to admit.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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