Abstract
Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite two-person prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside option reveal that: (i) an attractive outside option enhances cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, (ii) if the payoff for mutual defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive, (iii) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behavior.
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Hauk, E. Multiple Prisoner's Dilemma Games with(out) an Outside Option: an Experimental Study. Theory and Decision 54, 207–229 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1027385819400
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1027385819400