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On Mill, Infallibility, and Freedom of Expression

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Abstract

Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’. I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit, if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism.

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Correspondence to Alan Haworth.

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Haworth, A. On Mill, Infallibility, and Freedom of Expression. Res Publica 13, 77–100 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-006-9016-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-006-9016-5

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