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Epistemic conceptions of begging the question

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Abstract

A number of epistemologists have recently concluded that a piece of reasoning may be epistemically permissible even when it is impossible for the reasoning subject to present her reasoning as an argument without begging the question. I agree with these epistemologists, but argue that none has sufficiently divorced the notion of begging the question from epistemic notions. I present a proposal for a characterization of begging the question in purely pragmatic terms.

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Correspondence to Allan Hazlett.

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Hazlett, A. Epistemic conceptions of begging the question. Erkenntnis 65, 343–363 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9004-3

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