Abstract
A number of epistemologists have recently concluded that a piece of reasoning may be epistemically permissible even when it is impossible for the reasoning subject to present her reasoning as an argument without begging the question. I agree with these epistemologists, but argue that none has sufficiently divorced the notion of begging the question from epistemic notions. I present a proposal for a characterization of begging the question in purely pragmatic terms.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chisholm R. (1989). Theory of Knowledge, third edition. Prentice-Hall, New York
Davies M. (2001). Externalism and Armchair Knowledge. In: Boghossian and Peacocke (eds) New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 384–414
Davies M. (2004). Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission, and Easy Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:213–245
Fine K. (1999). Vagueness, Truth, and Logic. In: Keefe and Smith (eds) Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 119–150
Jackson F. (1987). Conditionals. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Keefe R. (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Markie P. (2005). Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70:406–416
Moore, G. E.: 1959, ‚Some Judgements of Perception,ȁ9 in Philosophical Studies, Littlefield, Adams, and CO., Paterson, New Jersey, pp. 220–252
Moore, G. E.: 1962, ‚Four Forms of Scepticism,ȁ9 in Philosophical Papers, Allen and Unwin/Collier Books, New York, pp. 193–222
Moore, G. E.: 1993a, ‚Humeȁ9s Theory Examined,ȁ9 in Selected Writings, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 59–78
Moore, G. E.: 1993b, ‚Proof of an External World,ȁ9 in Selected Writings, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 147–170
Pryor J. (2004). Whatȁ9s Wrong with Mooreȁ9s Argument?. Philosophical Issues 14:349–378
Van Cleve J. (2002). Is Knowledge Easy or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Answer to Skepticism. In Luper (eds) The Skeptics. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 45–59
Wright, C.: 2003, ‚Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inferenceȁ9 in Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 57–77
Wright C. (2000). Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinseyȁ9s Paradox and Putnamȁ9s Proof. Philosophical Issues 10:140–163
Wright C. (2004). Warrant For Nothing (And Foundations For Free?). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167–212
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hazlett, A. Epistemic conceptions of begging the question. Erkenntnis 65, 343–363 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9004-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9004-3