Abstract
Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare (“desire satisfactionism”) are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one’s life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about pleasure is clarified and defended only after we proceed through the dialectics that get us to the most plausible forms of hedonism and desire satisfactionism.
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Heathwood, C. Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. Philos Stud 128, 539–563 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7817-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7817-y