Abstract
The paper deals with partiality flowing from special relationships. Two main problems are discussed. The first concerns the relationship between partiality and genuine moral obligations. If partiality can bring about such obligations only if it is reasonable, what requirements should it meet in order to be reasonable? The second problem is one of animal ethics. Can the concept of reasonable partiality help us articulate what is morally at stake in a current discussion about the treatment of domestic animals, viz. the European discussion about the castration of pigs?
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Heeger, R. Reasonable Partiality to Domestic Animals. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 8, 123–139 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-3294-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-3294-4