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On Husserl’s Remark that “[s]elbst eine sich als apodiktisch ausgebende Evidenz kann sich als Täuschung enthüllen …” (XVII 164:32–33): Does the Phenomenological Method Yield Any Epistemic Infallibility?

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Addressing Walter Hopp’s original application of the distinction between agent-fallibility and method-fallibility to phenomenological inquiry concerning epistemic justification, I question whether these are the only two forms of fallibility that are useful or whether there are not also others that are needed. In doing so, I draw my inspiration from Husserl, who in the beginnings of his phenomenological investigations struggled with the distinction between noetic and noematic analyses. For example, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Logical Investigations he criticizes the First Investigation as having been “one-sidedly” noetically directed and as having thus neglected the noematic aspects of meaning (XVIII 13–14). Also, in an addendum to the Fifth Investigation he notes that in the transition from the First Edition to the Second he has learned to broaden the concept of “phenomenological content” to include not only the “real” (reell) contents (noetic, subjective) of consciousness but also the “intentional” (noematic, objective) (XIX/1 411). The fact that, in gradually moving from consciousness (noesis) to what consciousness is of (noema), Husserl struggled with this distinction is an indication of the immensity of the perplexing problems and potential solutions that Hopp has led the phenomenology of knowledge into by introducing his useful notions of agent-fallibility and method-fallibility. Like Husserl, he has focused mainly and mostly on the noetic issues; like Husserl as well, I will try to move step by step from the noetic area into the noematic. I conclude that Hopp’s approach has the potential to become seminal.

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Notes

  1. All references to the works of Husserl are to Husserliana by volume (Roman numerals) and page (Arabic).

  2. See the skeletal but helpful account of Hatfield (1998).

  3. See Logical Investigations, First Part: Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900).

  4. See Logical Investigations, Second Part: Investigations into Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge (1901).

  5. Although Hopp does not usually (and not at all after his introductory remarks) use the words “infallible” or “infallibility”, I will do so regularly. After all, it is a bit unnatural to use the words “fallible” or “fallibility” repeatedly without ever using their corresponding counterparts. What everyone really wants to know anyway is whether the phenomenological method does grant the highest conceivable degree of warrant. This is an issue that confronts the readers of Husserl, even if he too does not talk of “infallible” or “infallibility”, nor of “fallible” or “fallibility”.

  6. Cf., e.g. (M. = method, ph. = phenomenological, tr. = transcendental): I 43 (tr.-ph. M.), 103 ff. (ph. M.; eidetic-descriptive M.), 106 (special tr. Ms.), 119 (intentional M.), 170 (intentional M.), 179 f. (genuine ph. M.); II 3, 23 ff. (ph. M. as “Denkhaltung”), 43, 51, 58 (differentiae specificae of ph. M.); III/1 5 (M. of epoché), 55, 65 (M. of bracketing), 69, 125 (M. of tr. reduction), 130 (ph. M.), 136 f., 139, 144 (M. of eidetic science), 145 (M. of “Wesenserfassung”), 149, 161, 162 (ph. M.), 170 (phenomenological M.; psychological M.), 171 (inductive M.), 223 (methodology of phenomenology [Methodik der Phänomenologie]), 229 (ph. M.), 288 ff. (M. of clarification); V 138, 144, 148, 160, 162; VI 7 f. (new method of the positive sciences), 10, 12, 14 (ph. M. and apodicticity), 19, 23 (M. of idealization), 24 (productive M.), 29, 30 (M. and apodicticity), 31, 36 (inductive M.), 39 ff., 41 (methodology [Methodik]), 42 (natural-scientific M.), 43, 48, 49 (geometric M.), 52 f., 57 f., 60, 61 (natural-scientific M.), 64 (natural-scientific M.), 67 (M. of expansion or extension of knowledge), 68 (methodologization [Methodisierung]), 73 (ph. M. and apodicticity), 88, 94 (rational M.), 106 (regressive M.), 103 (transcendental-subjective M.), 113, 116 (regressive M.), 118 (regressive M.), 120 (regressive M.), 121, 135 ff., 149, 156, 173, 182 (eidetic M. of “Wesensforschung”), 185, 190 f., 193 ff., 202, 205, 207, 213 (M. of tr. reduction), 219 (naturalistic M.), 224 ff. (descriptive and explanatory M.), 230 (eidetic M. of theoretical “Wesensforschung”), 237 (M. of intentional analysis), 239 (“die eigentümliche Methode der Epoché”), 243, 246, 251 (M. of epoché), 264 (M. of epoché), 271, 274; VII 8 f. (M. of perfect clarification), 11 (rational doctrine of M.), 13, 17 (doctrine of M. [Methodenlehre]), 26 (M. of truth), 30 ff. (doctrine of M.), 33 (doctrine of M. of knowledge), 34 (doctrine of M.), 35 (rational doctrine of M.), 53, 54 (doctrine of M.), 73 (methodology [Methodik]), 91, 123, 138, 139 (M. of “Wesensintuition”), 142 (philosophical M.), 146 (M. and intuitionism), 167, 176, 194 (consciousness of M. [Methodenbewußtsein]), 195; VIII 4, 5 (M. of justification), 38, 78, 80, 87, 92 (M. of epoché), 111 (M. of bracketing), 121 (M. of epoché), 128 (ph. M.), 130 (ph. M.), 138, 141 (M. of epoché), 142, 164, 165 (M. of epoché), 166, 168 (tr. M.); XVII 6, 11 (rational M.), 40, 190, 205, 219 (radical M.), 233 (scientific M.), 252 ff. (rigorous M.; eidetic M. of “Wesensforschung”), 265 (radical M.), 270 (M. of intentional research), 285, 298; XVIII 35, 37, 38 (algorithmic M.; M. of classification), 39 (mechanical M.), 40, 132 (doctrine of M.), 165, 255; XIX/2 783 (ph. M.); XXV 16–17 (M. of clarification), 18–25 (the experimental M.), 25–37 (the true M.), 38–39 (this ph. M.), 61–62 (all indirectly symbolizing and mathematicizing Ms.).

  7. Peirce (1931), sec. 1.120: “The Uncertainty of Scientific Results”.

  8. Feyerabend (1975, 1978, 1987).

  9. Goldman (1986, 1992).

  10. Popper (1934/35, 1963, 1972).

  11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, VII 54 and IV 28.

  12. Idem, op. cit., IX 62, 74 ff., and Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I 1–13.

  13. Cairns (1973), p. 2.

  14. Husserl, Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907, ed. Ulrich Claesges (The Hague 1973), pp. 105–139.

  15. Sokolowski (1970).

  16. See Heffernan (1998).

  17. Sokolowski (1974), pp. 57–85.

  18. Politeia 476d–477b, Theaetetus 152c, Timaeus 51e–52c—leaving out Parmenides.

  19. An exception to the rule is: Thomas Kelly, “Evidence”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy @ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/. A good example of a philosopher who sought to define “knowledge” in terms of evidence without ever genuinely defining “evidence” is Chisholm (1966/1977/1989).

  20. The best book-length study in English of the formation and development of Husserl’s concept of evidence remains Levin (1970). See also Tugendhat (1967) and Levinas (1930).

  21. Cf. Seneca, De brevitate vitae 1.1, and Hippokrates, Aphorisms 1.1.

  22. Another way to contextualize Husserl’s texts on evidence would be to use the texts of other philosophers on this topic. See Heffernan (2000). Readers are referred to the second, corrected version, not to the first one, which was printed replete with errors added by the agent-fallible publisher.

  23. Metaphysics V (Delta).

  24. Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis/Cambridge, MA 1999), 1094b12–27.

  25. See Heffernan (1997).

  26. Heisenberg (1930).

  27. Gödel (1931).

  28. Gettier (1963).

  29. Quine (1960).

  30. Davidson (1984).

  31. Prigogine and Stengers (1997).

  32. Dawkins (2006).

  33. Shattuck (1996), pp. 137–163.

  34. Gadamer (1960), Part One, Section One, Chapter Three: “Recovery of the Question about the Truth of Art”.

  35. Plato, Theaetetus 172b–177c (this is not a “digression”).

  36. Philosophical Investigations, § 123.

  37. Plato, Meno 97a–c. But see also Politeia 506c.

  38. Discourse on the Method, 1.5, 2.1, 3.3.

  39. Sein und Zeit, § 7: “Die phänomenologische Methode der Untersuchung”.

  40. Heidegger, Holzwege (1950).

  41. Heidegger, Wegmarken (1967).

  42. c. Acad. 3.15.34 (my translation).

  43. At the exchange in Milwaukee, Elizabeth Behnke suggested that the phenomenological method is like a compass, an instrument for orientation. This thought is worth considering, so long as the idea is not that the method is anything mechanical, like a global positioning system.

  44. Plato, Crito 43a ff., Phaedo 57a ff.

  45. The location is not even given on the extraordinarily detailed Historical Map of Athens published by the Hellenic Ministry of Culture Archaeological Receipts Fund (Athens 2004).

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Acknowledgements

This paper represents the revised version of my comments on Hopp’s paper, both of which were presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of the International Husserl Circle, Marquette University, June 27, 2008. I thank Walter Hopp, Steven Crowell, Sebastian Luft, Pol Vandevelde, and all the other colleagues, too numerous to name, who contributed to the discussion.

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  1. Philosophy Department, Augustinian College, Andover, MA, USA

    George Heffernan

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Heffernan, G. On Husserl’s Remark that “[s]elbst eine sich als apodiktisch ausgebende Evidenz kann sich als Täuschung enthüllen …” (XVII 164:32–33): Does the Phenomenological Method Yield Any Epistemic Infallibility?. Husserl Stud 25, 15–43 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-008-9051-5

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