Journal of the History of Philosophy

John of Salisbury and the Problem of Universals BRIAN HENDLEY ONE OF Till] MOSTPI~R$Ib-'TENTand vexing philosophical problems in the Middle Ages was that of the nature of universals. Beginning with Boethius' second commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry, the dispute centered on the question of the existence of genera and species. Are they mere concepts of the mind or can they also be said to subsist? If they subsist, are they corporeal or incorporeal? If incorporeal , do they subsist separated from sensible things or in union with them? Porphyry himself refused to answer these questions because his work was intended for be~nners in logic; Boethius spells out the Aristotelian solution but does so primarily because the work he is commenting on is an introduction to Aristotle's Categories.1 Having been introduced to the problem, medieval thinkers tried to solve it in a variety of ways. Some claimed to be following Plato or Aristotle; others saw their solutions as original and final. By the twelfth century, John of Salisbury was moved to observe that more time had been spent on the problem of universals "than the line of the Caesars has consumed in subduing and ruling the world . . ." (Policraticus , VII, 12). John is a leading source of information about this problem and has been called "the historian of the universals controversy." 2 In Book II, Chapter 17, of his Metalogicon (written in 1159), he summarizes nine current views of universals; and in Chapter 20 he proposes a solution to the problem. John's proposed solution has been variously interpreted. Some see it as a "common sense" solution, reflecting the practical down-to-earth character of John's thought. Others say that John merely adopts the position of Aristotle. Peirce claims that John displays a kind of "Platonistic nominalism" in regard to universals like that of Abailard. A highly critical interpretation is that of Carl Prantl who asserts that John has no solution to offer to this or any other philosophical problem. Very few critics have credited John with an original view worthy of philosophical consideration and even these differ as to what exactly this view is.s t Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii, In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta, in J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina (Paris, 1844-1864), vol. 64, col. 71-86. Translated by Richard McKeon in his Selections From Medieval Philosophers (New York, 1929), voL I, 70-99, subsequently referred to in the text as McKeon. S. J. Curtis, A Short History of Western Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1950), chap. 5: "John of Salisbury, the Historian of the Universals Controversy." * John's proposed solution is a "common sense" one: Herman Shapiro, ed., Medieval [289] 290 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I contend that John's proposed solution to the problem of universals can best be appreciated in the context of his theory of knowledge. I also feel that it can be distinguished from the nine views he summarizes and from those of Plato and Aristotle. Finally, I think that John's view can be fruitfully compared with that of John Locke. Let us begin with John's own summary of the solutions to the problem which were prevalent in his day. NINE VIEWS OF UNIVERSALS The Metalogicon is a defense of the arts of the Trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and logic) which includes one of the first Western commentaries on the newly rediscovered Organon. 4 Books IH and IV axe chiefly concerned with the individual books of the Organon, while Book II puts forth some preliminary observations as to the nature and scope of logic. Chapter 17 discusses current views of the namrr of genera and species as an example of "In what a pernicious manner logic is sometimes taught." 5 One explanation of universals like genera and species was that they were Philosophy (New York, 1964), p. 177; and E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p. 152. John's view is basically Aristotelian: Clement C. J. Webb, John of Salisbury (London, 1932), pp. 87-88 and Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning, second ed., rev. (New York, 1960), pp. 121 and 194. John is...