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Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualism

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Abstract

Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism.

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  1. University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

    Stephen Hetherington

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  1. Stephen Hetherington
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Correspondence to Stephen Hetherington.

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Hetherington, S. Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualism. Synthese 190, 2835–2851 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0088-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0088-9

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