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Abstract

In this paper I develop a theological account of intrinsic value drawn from some passages in Robert Merrihew Adams’ book Finite and Infinite Goods. First I explain why Adams’ work on this topic is interesting, situate his theory within the broader literature on intrinsic value, and draw attention to some of its revisionist features. Next I state the theory, raise some problems for it, and refine it in light of those problems. Then I illustrate how the refined theory works by showing that it has the resources to deal with some seemingly formidable objections.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Feldman (1998).

  2. Finite and Infinite Goods is the subject of a symposium in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. A Theory of Virtue is the subject of a symposium in Philosophical Studies (Adams 2006).

  3. Authors, for example, as diverse as Richard Boyd, Fred Feldman, and Mark Johnston have praised various portions of Adams book. Boyd (2003) says that “Finite and Infinite Goods makes an especially important contribution to our understanding of the naturalist realist project in metaethics.” Feldman (2004, p. 17) calls Adams’ discussion of welfare in Finite and Infinite Goods “impressive.” Johnston (2009, p. 25) says that Finite and Infinite Goods is “magisterial.”

  4. The accounts of instrumental badness and motivational badness are not necessarily meant to be accounts of our ordinary concepts of instrumental and motivational badness or anything like that. They are instead technical terms introduced to enable the theory to avoid the three objections that concern me in this paper.

  5. I should illustrate this point with some examples: Hitler subjected some Jews to experiments and withheld from them proper nutrition. These practices damaged their cognitive faculties and abilities. That is a decrease in the degree to which they are similar to God. Before the Holocaust there were many Jews who were members of communities. Hitler broke many of these communities up. Since God is a member of a communities (the Trinity and His people) that is a decrease in the degree to which they were similar to God. Hitler caused many Germans to hate Jews. Since God loves Jews that is a decrease in the degree to which those Germans were similar to God.

  6. This premise is questionable. But grant it for the sake of argument.

  7. Thanks to Fred Feldman for suggesting (v3).

  8. Grounding is the relation discussed in Rosen (2010) and Schaffer (2009).

  9. I have heard two complaints about modifying Adams’ theory in this way. First, I have been told that the modification I introduce is “ad hoc” and that I am “gerrymandering” Adams’ theory. Perhaps what someone who offers this objection means is that I introduce the fallen properties revision without any motivation other than the fact that it makes Adams’ theory produce the correct judgment about Hitler and Hitler1 and Hitler2. But, such people seem to be claiming, modifications to a theory need independent motivation. So the fallen properties reply is defective.

    Second, I have been told that I rely on a confusion about the relation between intrinsic and extrinsic value. My account of fallen properties implies that the intrinsic value of an object is sometimes altered by the extrinsic value of that object. But, as Moore has taught us, such a suggestion is incoherent and unintelligible. So my modification of Adams’ theory is defective.

    It is important to see that these objections are mistaken. Concerning the complaint about ad-hoc-ness and gerrymandering: The objector is holding me to an unreasonably high standard. Consider Feldman (1983). In some passages he introduces modifications to utilitarianism with no other motivation than the fact that those modifications make utilitarianism deliver the correct judgment about a class of cases. Sider (1991, 1993) does the same thing. This is a common strategy. So the way in which I develop Adams’ theory is in accordance with tradition.

    I will, however, leave all of this to the side. I can meet the objector’s unreasonably high standards. There is a precedent, in the literature, for the sort of move I have made. Shelly Kagan (1998, p.281) has argued, on the basis of several examples, that the extrinsic value of an object can alter its intrinsic value. He says this: “I want to leave open the possibility that the intrinsic value of an object may be based (in part) on its instrumental value.” Much more recently, while commenting on Adams’ theory, Kagan (2009a, p. 390) repeats this line. Josh Parsons (manuscript, p. 1) takes a similar line. He says this: “Suffice it to say that... objects can sometimes be instrumentally intrinsically valuable, and sometimes be finally extrinsically valuable... and let it be taken that people sometimes use “intrinsically valuable” when they clearly mean “valuable as-an-end”, and use that misleading phrase to conflate the two.” So there is a precedent in the literature, based on counterexamples to orthodoxy, for the sort of move I have made. Therefore, although I do not need it, there is independent motivation for my introduction of fallen properties.

    Concerning the second, Moorean, complaint: Bradley (2002) has argued persuasively that Kagan’s examples can be accommodated by the Moorean. Bradley deals with the examples by saying that it is not objects but states of affairs that are the bearers of intrinsic value. With respect to my purposes, however, Bradley’s response to Kagan is concessive. He allows that a state of affairs ascribing extrinsic value to an object can have intrinsic value. Here is what Bradley (2002, p. 26) says:

    Mooreans do indeed deny that for any x, the uniqueness or usefulness of x is relevant to x’s intrinsic value. But I know of no evidence that Mooreans would deny that for any x, states of affairs ascribing uniqueness or usefulness to x could have intrinsic value. In fact, it must be pointed out that many philosophers within the Moorean tradition have thought that states of affairs ascribing non-intrinsic properties have intrinsic value.

    In light of Bradley’s work on this topic, the fallen properties reply, could easily be translated into terms that a Moorean would find unobjectionable. Following Bradley’s strategy, one could recast Adams’ theory in terms of states of affairs rather than objects. So a state of affairs ascribing fallen properties to an object would have less intrinsic value than one that did not. The relevant issue, therefore, is whether objects or states of affairs are the primary bearers of intrinsic value. Adams’ theory can be formulated so as to accommodate either outcome.

  10. Adams’ discussion of welfare appears in Chapter Two of Finite and Infinite Goods. For similar theories see Feldman (2002, 2004) as well as Kagan (2009b).

  11. Keep in mind here that fundamental intrinsic value and overall intrinsic value are distinct.

  12. Several people have presented me with one variant or another of the following objection: “God is infinite and everything else is finite. So nothing is more similar to Him than anything else. Consider the case of beliefs. Suppose that I have 5 true beliefs and you have a billion. In that case we are both equally far from God’s omniscience. So, neither of us is more similar to God than the other with respect to being omniscient.” It is important to see that this objection is mistaken. Consider similarity to God with respect to the avoidance of false beliefs. God has 0 false beliefs. Suppose that I have 40 billion false beliefs and that you have 13 false beliefs. 13 is much closer to 0 than 40 billion. So you are much more similar to God with respect to the avoidance of false beliefs than I am. Consider similarity to God with respect to the probability that one’s beliefs are true. The probability that God’s beliefs are true is always 1. The probability that our beliefs are true varies. But suppose that on this occasion the probability that my beliefs are true is .2 and yours is .75. A probability of .75 is much closer to 1 than a probability of .2. So you are much more similar to God with respect to the probability that one’s beliefs are true than I am. Consider being similar to God with respect to, not the number of beliefs He has, but instead each particular belief that He has. Suppose I believe the proposition ‘2 + 2 = 4’. I am not more similar to God than my counterpart who does not believe this proposition with respect to having the same number of beliefs that He does. This is for the very reason that the objector points out. But I am more similar to God, than my counterpart, in this sense: God and I share the property of having the belief ‘2 + 2 = 4’. Aside from beliefs: Consider the property of being a person. God has the property of being a person. You and I have the property of being a person. You and I sharing this property with God makes us more similar to Him than, say a rock or a book, is. Consider being actualized or existing. God exists and is actual. You and I exist and are actualized. So in this respect we are more similar to Him than some merely possible or non-existent object.

  13. Lewis’ analysis is this:

    A counterfactual ‘If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C’ is (non-vacuously) true at a possible world, W, if and only if there exists some (accessible) possible world at which A and C are true that is closer to W than any possible world at which A is true and C is false.

    Closeness, for Lewis, is a similarity relation between possible worlds governed by the following system of weights and priorities:

    1. (1)

      It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.

    2. (2)

      It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.

    3. (3)

      It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law.

    4. (4)

      It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.

  14. To see this reason as follows: According to Lewis, avoidance of a big widespread and diverse violation of @’s laws has more weight in determining closeness to @ than matching @ with respect to particular matter of fact. Furthermore, Adams’ belief that ‘I am God’ at W1 requires such a violation of the psychological laws governing beliefs with respect to @. Here is why: No one at @ has beliefs that are so dramatically causally isolated from each other and from behavior in the way that Adams’ belief at W1 is. Adams’ belief at W1 was not caused by anything. For each instant of time at which Adams believes ‘I am God’ at W1, he is held back from forming closely related beliefs such as ‘Adams is God’ and from dropping beliefs that are obviously inconsistent with ‘I am God’ such as ‘Adams is not God’. Adams’ belief never shows up in his behavior. Not even his psychotherapist can tell that Adams believes ‘I am God’. Not even Adams believes ‘Adams believes he is God.’ At W2, on the other hand, Adams’ belief conforms to the psychological laws of @. His belief is caused by a thorough brainwashing combined with a series of ecstatic marijuana induced rituals at the cult compound. His belief causally interacts with his other beliefs producing and being reinforced by them. His belief has a causal influence on his behavior. Though the result is much less of a match with @ with respect to particular matter of fact, it avoids a violation of the psychological laws of @. So W2 is closer to @ than W1.

  15. To see this, reason as follows: Adams at W2 shares one new belief with God, namely ‘I am God’, that Adams at @ does not have. But Adams at W2 gains many crazy and false beliefs that God does not have such as ‘Adams is God’ and ‘God should leave the compound sometime today and head over to the grocery store to get some stuff for the fridge’ and he loses many sane and true beliefs that he has in common with God at @ such as ‘Adams is not God’ and ‘God was not born in the 20th Century’. So at W2 Adams is less similar to God than he is at @.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to Lynne Baker, Andrew Dole, Pete Graham, Gary Mathews, James Patten, Alex Sarch, the members of Lynne and Gary’s Fall 2008 Philosophy of Religion Seminar, and the two reviewers for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Special thanks to Lowell Friesen for many insightful discussions of this topic over coffee. Most of all I thank Fred Feldman for extensive commentary and discussion of countless drafts of this paper.

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Hill, S. An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 273–289 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9244-9

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