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Introspective awareness of sensations

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Abstract

My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of themetaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about theepistemological status of introspective beliefs.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, 127 Kimpel Hall, University of Arkansas, 72701, Fayetteville, AR, USA

    Christopher S. Hill

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  1. Christopher S. Hill
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I owe a large debt to Sydney Shoemaker. I have been helped considerably both by conversations with him and by the lectures he gave in the summer of 1985 in his N.E.H. Summer Seminar on Self-Consciousness and Self-Reference. I have also received valuable advice from Richard Lee, David Roach, David A. Schroeder, Lynne Spellman, and (especially) Anthony L. Brueckner, Willem de Vries, and David H. Westendorf.

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Hill, C.S. Introspective awareness of sensations. Topoi 7, 11–24 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00776205

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00776205

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