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Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision.

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Abstract

In the companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part I), a general framework for realistic modelling of instantaneous states of belief and of the operations involving them was presented and motivated. In this paper, the framework is applied to the case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, firstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-specified, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators for iterated revision as special cases; and finally, offers an analysis of Rott’s recent counterexample to several Gärdenfors postulates [32], elucidating in what sense it fails to be one of the special cases to which these postulates apply.

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  1. GREGHEC and IHPST, HEC Paris, 1 rue de la Libération, 78351, Jouy-en-Josas, France

    Brian Hill

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Hill, B. Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision.. Stud Logica 89, 291–323 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9130-9

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