Journal of the History of Philosophy

The Deep Challenge of Pyrrhonian Scepticism DAVID R. HILEY ANCIENT GREEKAND EARLYMODERNscepticism was directed as much against the desirability of knowledge as against its possibility. The Pyrrhonian sceptics ' epistemological arguments had a fundamentally moral purpose since, in opposing the dogmatism of philosophical theory, what was at issue was whether knowledge could bring happiness. The Pyrrhonists opposed philosophers ' claims to know in order to suspend belief and achieve quietude. Contemporary epistemology has lost this moral point of scepticism. In the epistemological tradition since Locke and Hume, scepticism has been identified with a rather narrow set of technical issues arising from the theory of ideas and the representational theory of knowledge which emerged in the seventeenth century. For post-seventeenth century scepticism the fundamental problem posed by the sceptic was the impossibility of penetrating the "veil of ideas," that is, the impossibility of bridging the gap between foundational ideas in the mind of the knower and the world independent of thought. This identification of scepticism with "the problem of the external world"for all the subsequent interest it has held for philosophy--ignores the deeper challenge of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The last two decades have seen a renewal of interest in scepticism from two directions. Among epistemologists, scepticism has become problematic again because of vigorous defenses and close examinations beginning with Peter Unger's Ignorance: A Case for Universal Scepticism,' and extending through Barry Stroud's recent book, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism ? Among classicists, there has been a revival of scholarship on the Greek sceptics, partly because of their intrinsic interest and partly because of their ' Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Universal Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). ' Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). [1851 x86 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 95:2 APRIL 1987 relation to the Stoa, which also has seen a revival of scholarly interest. Two important recent collections of essays are noteworthy: Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies m Hellenistic Epistemology3 and The Skeptical Tradition.4 With the recent epistemological interest in scepticism, there has been practically no attention given to Pyrrhonism as a moral stance except in passing. There are two exceptions, however. Oliver Johnson, in his Skepticism & Cognitivism , devotes a chapter to Arne Naess' defense of Pyrrhonism. 5 Benson Mates, in his recent presidential address to the American Philosophical Association , distinguishes and discusses in turn three forms of scepticism--Pyrrhonism , Berkeleyan scepticism, and Humean scepticism.6 Both accounts share a common feature. They realize that the epistemological arguments of Pyrrhonism are distinct from its moral goal and they find the primary interest of Pyrrhonism to be epistemological. Johnson finds the moral goal of Pyrrhonism more plausible than the epistemological arguments but claims that an examination of Pyrrhonism as a moral movement is out of place in a study of scepticism as an epistemological theory. Mates emphasizes the fact that the aim of Pyrrhonism is to achieve inner quietude by suspending judgment. However, he considers the moral thrust of Pyrrhonism only insofar as doing so allows him to conclude that the sceptic's tropes apply not only to knowledge proper, but to the rationality of belief as well. Neither takes Pyrrhonian scepticism seriously as a practical challenge relevant for the conduct of life. In his recent book, Stroud is concerned with the consequences of scepticism for everyday life, but the form of scepticism that he claims to be deeply rooted in the human condition is external world scepticism and he dismisses Pyrrhonism in the preface as a "historical question." I suspect that epistemologists have considered Pyrrhonism of merely historical interest because we have too readily accepted Hume's claim that one could not live a life without belief, that Nature defeated Pyrrhonism. My interest in this paper is to consider the practical significance of Pyrrhonism on its own terms. I hope to show that Pyrrhonism constitutes a challenge to both the possibility and the desirability of philosophy with the goal of suspending belief in order to live tranquilly in accordance with inMalcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes, editors, Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198o). 4 Myles Burnyeat, editor, The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984...