Abstract
In order to illustrate the nature of the indeterminacy of meaning, Donald Davidson sometimes compares it to the fact that we can measure length or temperature on different scales. In the following paper I try to explain first why we are supposed to expect such an analogy, given the semantics of the word ‘meaning’ and of the word ‘length’ or ‘temperature’. In the second part I examine how close the analogy is by distinguishing different forms of indeterminacy of meaning (viz., the indeterminacy of reference and the indeterminacy of truth) and ask whether both forms have an equivalent in a theory of measurement. I shall conclude that this is indeed the case.
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I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his or her detailed comments on a first version of this paper, which helped me to clarify my views considerably.
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Hofmann, A. On the nature of meaning and its indeterminacy: Davidson's view in perspective. Erkenntnis 42, 15–40 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01666810
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01666810