Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately “secondary quality eliminativism”–the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated. In addition to being of interest in its own right, this new argument provides a perspective to better see that certain popular would-be refutations of the knowledge argument do not work (against either version). But it also introduces some complications that will force us to take an unexpected detour through the pros and cons of naturalizing intentionality before (tentatively) embracing Jackson’s dualist conclusion.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • D. Armstrong (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind Humanities Press New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Averill, E. (1985): ‘Color and the Anthropocentric Problem’, Journal of Philosophy 82, 281–304, Reprinted in A. Byrne and D. Hilbert (eds.) (1997a).

  • N. Block O. Flanagan G. Guzeldere (Eds) (1997) The Nature of Consciousness MIT Press Cambridge, MA and London

    Google Scholar 

  • Boghossian, P. and Velleman, D. (1989): ‘Colour as a Secondary Quality’, Mind 98, 81–193. reprinted in A. Byrne and D. Hilbert (eds.) (1997a).

  • Broackes, J. (1992): ‘The Autonomy of Colour’, in D. Charles, and K. Lennon, (eds) (1992), reprinted in A. Byrne, and D. Hilbert, (eds.) (1997a).

  • Byrne, A. and Hilbert, D. (eds.) (1997a): Readings on Color, vol. 1: The Philosophy of Color, Cambridge, MA, London: MIT Press

  • Byrne, A. and Hilbert, D. (eds.) (1997b): Readings on Color, vol. 2: The Science of Color, Cambridge, MA, London: MIT Press

  • P. Carruthers (2000) Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P. (2001): ‘Response to Joe Levine’, Sito Web Italiano per la Filosofia, Philosophy of Mind Forums, http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/carruthers4.htm

  • D. Chalmers (1996) The Conscious Mind Oxford University Press New York, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Chalmers (1999) ArticleTitle‘Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 473–495

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Charles K. Lennon (Eds) (1992) Reduction, Explanation and Realism Oxford University Press New York, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Churchland (1989) A Neurocomputational Perspective MIT Press Cambridge, MA and London

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Churchland (2002) ArticleTitle‘Outer Space and Inner Space: The New Epistemology’ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 76 IssueID2 25–48

    Google Scholar 

  • A. Clark (2000) A Theory of Sentience Oxford University Press Oxford, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • E. Conee (1994) ArticleTitle‘Phenomenal Knowledge’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 136–150

    Google Scholar 

  • J.R. Cronly-Dillon R.L. Gregory (Eds) (1991) Evolution of the Eye and Visual System CRC Press Boca Raton, FL

    Google Scholar 

  • S. Davis (Eds) (2000) Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic and Computational Perspectives Oxford University Press Oxford, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Dennett (1991) Consciousness Explained Little, Brown and Company Boston, Toronto, London

    Google Scholar 

  • F. Dretske (1995) Naturalizing the Mind MIT Press Cambridge, MA, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigl, H. (1958): ‘The ‘Mental’ and the “Physical”’, in H. Feigl, and M. Scriven, (eds.)

  • H. Feigl M. Scriven (Eds) (1956) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • H. Feigl M. Scriven G. Maxwell (Eds) (1958) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Fodor (1987) Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind MIT Press Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Fodor (1990) A Theory of Content MIT Press Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Fodor (1998) Concepts Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • P. French T. Uehling H. Wettstein (Eds) (1977) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol 2: Studies in Semantics University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • V. Gerhardt R.-P. Horstmann R. Schumacher (2001) Kant und die Berliner Aufklarung: Akten des IX Inernationalen Kant-Kongresses Walter de Gruyter Press Berlin, NewYork

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (1990): ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.)

  • Harman, G.: ‘Explaining Objective Color in Terms of Subjective Reactions’ in E. Villenueva (ed.) (1996). Reprinted in A. Byrne, and D. Hilbert, (eds.) (1997a).

  • C.L. Hardin (1992) ArticleTitle‘The Virtues of Illusion’ Philosophical Studies 68 371–382 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00694852

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hilbert, D. and Kalderon, M.E. (2000): ‘Color and the Inverted Spectrum’, in S. Davis (ed.) (2000).

  • C. Hill B. McLaughlin (1999) ArticleTitle‘There are Fewer Things in Reality than are Dreamt of in Chalmers’ Philosophy’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 445–454

    Google Scholar 

  • E.L. Holman (2002) ArticleTitle‘Color Eliminativism and Color Experience’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 38–56 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1468-0114.t01-1-00139

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • T. Honderich (Eds) (1985) Morality and Objectivity Routledge & Kegan Paul London

    Google Scholar 

  • F. Jackson (1982) ArticleTitle‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ Philosophical Quarterly 32 127–136

    Google Scholar 

  • F. Jackson (1986) ArticleTitle‘What Mary Didn”t Know’ The Journal of Philosophy 83 291–295

    Google Scholar 

  • F. Jackson (1998) Mind, Method and Conditionals Routledge London and New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F. (2000): ‘Philosophizing about Color’, in Davis (2000).

  • Johnston, M. (1992): ‘How to Speak of the Colors’, Philosophical Studies 68, 221–63. Reprinted in A. Byrne and D. Hilbert, (eds.) (1997a).

  • I. Kant (1987) Critique of Judgment Hackett Press Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • S. Kripke (1980) Naming and Necessity Harvard University Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, J. (2001): “Commentary on Peter Carruthers’, Phenomenal Consciousness,” Sito Web Italiano per la Filosofia Philosophy of Mind Forums, http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/levine.htm.

  • Lewis, D. (1990): ‘What Experience Teaches’, in Lycan, W. (ed.) (1990b).

  • Loar, B. (1990): ‘Phenomenal States’, in Tomberlin, J. (ed.) (1990).

  • Loar, B. (1997): ‘Phenomenal States’, in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, (eds.) (1997).

  • B. Loar (1999) ArticleTitle“David Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 465–472

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. (1990a): ‘What is the “Subjectivity” of the Mental?’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.) (1990).

  • W. Lycan (Eds) (1990b) Mind and Cognition Basil Blackwell Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (1985): ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in T. Honderich (ed.) (1985).

  • Meehl, P.E. and Sellars, W. (1956): ‘The Concept of Emergence’, in H. Feigl, and M. Scriven, (eds.) (1956).

  • R. Millikan (1984) Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories MIT Press Cambridge, MA and London

    Google Scholar 

  • Mollon, J.D. (1989): ‘Tho’ She Kneeled in that Place Where They Grew: The Uses and Origins of Primate Colour Vision’, Journal of Experimental Biology 146, 21–38. Reprinted in A. Byrne and D. Hilbert (1997b).

  • Mollon, J.D. (1991): “Uses and Evolutionary Origins of Primate Colour Vision”, in J.R. Cronly-Dillon and R.L. Gregory (eds.) (1991).

  • G.E. Moore (1903) ArticleTitle‘The Refutation of Idealism’ Mind 12 433–453

    Google Scholar 

  • Nemirow, L. (1990): ‘Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance’, in W. Lycan (ed.) (1990b).

  • C. Peacocke (1984) ArticleTitle‘Colour Concepts and Colour Experience’ Synthese 58 365–382 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00485247

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • I. Scherer (1995) The Crisis of Judgment in Kant’s Three Critiques Peter Lang Press New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Scherer, I. (2001): ‘Revisiting Kant’s General Metaphysics: in Terms of a Completed Transcendental Psychology’ in V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann and R. Schumacher (eds.) (2001).

  • Stampe, D. (1977): ‘Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation’, in P.French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, (eds.) (1997).

  • D. Stoljar (2001) ArticleTitle‘Two Conceptions of the Physical’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 253–281

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Tomberlin (Eds) (1990) Philosophical Perspectives, vol 4: Action Theory␣and Philosophy of Mind Ridgeview Publishing Co Atascadero, CA

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Tye (1995) Ten Problems of Consciousness MIT Press Cambridge, MA, London

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Tye (2000) Consciousness, Color and Content MIT Press Cambridge, MA, London

    Google Scholar 

  • E. Villenueva (Eds) (1996) Philosophical Issues, vol. 7 Ridgeview Publishing Co Atascadero, CA

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Phil. & Reli. studies, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, VA, 22030, USA

    Emmett L. Holman

Authors
  1. Emmett L. Holman
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Emmett L. Holman.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Holman, E.L. Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument. Philos Stud 128, 229–256 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7791-4

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7791-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation