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Harming Future Persons pp 71–92Cite as

Who Cares About Identity?

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Part of the book series: International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine ((LIME,volume 35))

Abstract

This paper argues that transworld identity is both morally (or at least “welfare axiologically”) and prudentially insignificant. To clarify, it does not in itself morally or prudentially matter, when comparing welfare distributions across possible worlds, whether or not the same people exist in these worlds. The moral claim is defended on the basis of a (wide) person-affecting moral principle. And the argument is made that what matters from one’s own prudential point of view is not that one comes into existence or continues to exist oneself but that an appropriate continuer/replacement does. Finally, some implications for gene-therapy are considered.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Section, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

    Nils Holtug

Authors
  1. Nils Holtug
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Correspondence to Nils Holtug .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, The College of New Jersey, Bliss Hall 112, 08628, Ewing, New Jersey, USA

    Melinda A. Roberts

  2. The Center for Ethics at Yeshiva University Yeshiva University, Atizapan Estado de México, 2495 Amsterdam Avenue, New York City, 10033, New York, USA

    David T. Wasserman

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Holtug, N. (2009). Who Cares About Identity?. In: Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (eds) Harming Future Persons. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5697-0_4

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