Abstract
The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, but it does point to significant connections between expressivism, unity, and embedding.
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Notes
According to Hanks’ notation, boldface is used to indicate reference act types (not actual referents or modes or presentation of referents), and uppercase to indicate property-expression act types (not actual properties or modes of presentation of properties).
While we follow Hanks in the use of ’mood’ to indicate a speech act type, this use departs from contemporary linguists who theorize about mood as a grammatical marker at the syntactic level. The underlying assumption is that there is coordination between a speaker’s communicative intentions and the linguistic entities that she chooses to deploy in order to realize those intentions.
Since the modern Frege–Geach problem is the very same problem, from the point of embedded negation rather than embedded conditionals, our theory predicts that force cancellation could play a role in a solution to the modern problem as well. To anticipate, we believe that a proper understanding of n2 involves cancellation of a certain type of normative endorsement. Furthermore, this solution generalizes across theoretical as well as practical cases of reasoning.
This raises questions about what mood is in the first place. What do imperative, interrogative, indicative, and now fictive moods have in common that allows each of them to unify a proposition? Is it that they just express an attitude that the speaker has toward the components of the proposition <George, CLEVER>? This is the proposal in Soames (2010), and we consider it in detail in the next section.
References
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Hanks, P. (2007). The content-force distinction. Philosophical Studies, 134, 141–164.
Hanks, P. (2011). Structured propositions as types. Mind, 120, 11–52.
Schroeder, M. (2008). How expressivists can and should solve their problem with negation. Noûs, 42, 573–599.
Schroeder, M. (2009). Hybrid expressivism: Virtues and vices. Ethics, 119, 257–309.
Soames, S. (2010). What is meaning? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Unwin, N. (1999). Quasi-realism, negation and the Frege–Geach problem. Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 337–352.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Peter Hanks, Kris McDaniel, Indrek Reiland, Adam Sennet, Dustin Tucker, and audiences at Texas Tech University and the 2012 Pacific APA for their helpful feedback. This work was made possible, in part, through the generous support of the Stanford Humanities Center.
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Hom, C., Schwartz, J. Unity and the Frege–Geach problem. Philos Stud 163, 15–24 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0079-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0079-1