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One Hundred Years of Semantic Paradox

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Abstract

This article contains an overview of the main problems, themes and theories relating to the semantic paradoxes in the twentieth century. From this historical overview I tentatively draw some lessons about the way in which the field may evolve in the next decade.

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Notes

  1. For a detailed discussion of the role of these paradoxes during the period 1900–1930, see [7, Section 2].

  2. To be more precise, he took the property ‘is true’ to be defined in terms of the more basic satisfaction relation (‘true of’).

  3. I ignore Tarski’s formal adequacy condition here, which is less important.

  4. To be more precise, p is required to be a structurally descriptive name.

  5. I will return to this point in the final section.

  6. For details about this evolution, see [7].

  7. More such complexity results can be found in [5].

  8. Detailed information about the complexity of the revision theoretic notions of truth is given in [42].

  9. The Weak Kleene variant is proof theoretically investigated in [11].

  10. See [14].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Leon Horsten

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  1. Leon Horsten
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Correspondence to Leon Horsten.

Additional information

A version of this article was presented in the CAPE Truth and Logic Workshop at the University of Kyoto (February, 2013). I am grateful to the audience for helpful comments and suggestions.

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Horsten, L. One Hundred Years of Semantic Paradox. J Philos Logic 44, 681–695 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9353-y

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