I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for logic, semantics, and metaphysics.
CITATION STYLE
Horgan, T. (1994). Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 159. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214169
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.