Abstract
We give a characterization of majority voting rules with quorums in the framework of May (Econometrica 20:680–684, 1952)’s seminal article. According to these voting rules, an alternative is socially chosen if and only if it obtains the relative majority of votes and the total number of voters not abstaining reaches the quorum.
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References
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May K.O.: A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decisions. Econometrica 20, 680–684 (1952)
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Houy, N. A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums. Theory Decis 67, 295–301 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9110-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9110-6