Skip to main content
Log in

Normativity in Quine's Naturalism: The Technology of Truth-Seeking?

  • Published:
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper, I review Quine's response to the normativity charge against naturalized epistemology. On this charge, Quine's naturalized epistemology neglects the essential normativity of the traditional theory of knowledge and hence cannot count as its successor. According to Quine, normativity is retained in naturalism as ‘the technology of truth-seeking’. I first disambiguate Quine's naturalism into three programs of increasing strength and clarify the strongest program by means of the so-called Epistemic Skinner Box. Then, I investigate two ways in which the appeal to technology as normative enterprise can be made good. I argue that neither coheres with other aspects of Quine's philosophy, most notably the elimination of intentionality. Finally, I briefly consider a third reconstruction of the response, which involves an extension of the web of “belief” to practical know-how. I conclude that the normativity of Quine's (strong) naturalism cannot be found in the technology of truth-seeking.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Baker, L. R.: 1995, Explaining Attitudes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1936, ‘Von Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik’, Actes du 8e Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, vol. 1, Hermann, Paris, pp. 36–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D.: 1986, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 307–319.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dipert, R.: 1993,Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haack, S.: 1993a, ‘The Two Faces of Quine's Naturalism’, Synthese 94, 335–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haack, S.: 1993b, Evidence and Inquiry, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J.: 1988, ‘What is “naturalized epistemology”?’, in: J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology, Ridgeview, Atadascero. NORMATIVITY IN QUINE's NATURALISM 267

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L.: 1987, ‘Progress or Rationality? The Prospects of Normative Naturalism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 19–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R.: 1993, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Preston, B.: 1998, ‘Why is aWing Like a Spoon? A Pluralist Theory of Function’, Journal of Philosophy 95, 215–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1960, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1968, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia UP, New York, 1969, pp. 69–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1969, ‘Natural Kinds’, in: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia UP, New York, pp. 114–138.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine. W. V.: 1973, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, LaSalle.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1975, ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, in: Theories and Things, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 68–72.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1978, ‘Postscript on Metaphor’, in: Theories and Things, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 187–189.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1980, ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, in: Theories and Things, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 1–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1986, ‘Reply to White’, in: L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, Open Court, LaSalle, pp. 663–665.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1990a, Pursuit of Truth, Harvard UP, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1990b, ‘Reply to Lauener’, in: Barrett and Gibson, Perspectives on Quine, Blackwell, Cambridge, p. 227.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1993, ‘In Praise of Observation Sentences’, Journal of Philosophy 90, 107–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E.: 1983, ‘Nature Unmirrored, Epistemology Naturalized’, Synthese 55, 49–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stroud, B.: 1984, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford UP, Oxford. Department of Philosophy Eindhoven University of Technology Den Dolech 2 P.O. Box 513 5600 MB Eindhoven The Netherlands (w.n.houkes@tm.tue.nl)

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Houkes, W. Normativity in Quine's Naturalism: The Technology of Truth-Seeking?. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33, 251–267 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022460619303

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022460619303

Navigation