Abstract
This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of any interest or power.
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Notes
As Josh Parsons points out, one doesn’t have to accept Kripkean necessity of genetic origins in order to accept this just that if I had had a different spouse or even waited a month or two to conceive, whatever other children I would have had would have been the equivalent of half or full siblings of my actual children. See Parsons, “Why the Handicapped Child Case is Hard,” Philosophical Studies, 112. 2, pp.147–162, 2003.
To be clear, I’m asking you to think about a world in which your family is annihilated and replaced, and you are completely unaware in that world of these events. It seems that looking at such a world from the outside we can recognize it as inferior, even if we wouldn’t complain if we were in the world.
Not all non-utilitarians share it, of course, but the fact that it is widespread makes it at least worth considering. Does one have to embrace some sort of agent-centered approach to morality to see this? I’m not sure, but even if one does, it is still a view that cannot be rejected out of hand.
See Josh Parsons, “Axiological Actualism,” Australian Journal of Philosophy vol. 80, No.2, June 2002, and Gustav Arrhenius, in a number of places, including “The Person Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People”, Ethical Perspectives, no. 3–4, 2003, discusses principles close to this. This is related to an idea defended by Jan Narveson in, “Utilitarianism and New Generations,” Mind 76 (1967). Incidentally, the spirit of this principle would be preserved if we replaced the word “people” with the word “individual” to accommodate non-human animals. It has been brought to my attention that this principle might rule out the value of unseen beautiful paintings or landscapes. Maybe so and maybe that is a reason to reject the principle, or maybe it can be adjusted to avoid that implication. I am not interested in defending the principle against all objections here, however.
Note that, on this view, it counts at all times, including times prior to Rudy’s existence. What matters is that she is actual, not that she currently exists. There is a small complication here. Some people say that we cannot compare Rudy’s well-being in the actual world with her well-being in the world where she does not exist. Josh Parsons gives an elegant argument for thinking that we can in “Axiological Actualism” p.144. I shall assume that such comparisons make sense. If we cannot make such comparisons, the Actuality Principle generates other paradoxical results of the sort I am interested in. So, nothing really hangs on these comparisons.
John Broome discusses an example like this. See Weighing Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p9 as does Gregory Kavka in “The Futurity Problem” in Obligations to Future Generations, Sikora and Barry (ed.) (Philadelphia, Temple University Press: 1978).
To think about what this means, consider two wrong acts, one of which is less wrong than the other; or two permissible acts, one of which, that we might call supererogatory, we have more moral reason to perform than the other.
At this point, it may look as if the Repugnant Conclusion made famous by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) rears its repulsive head. If the authorities decide to keep adding people to the world, we’ll end up with a world with tens of billions of people living just barely tolerable lives, and it will turn out that those decisions were right. Since it’s a well-known fact that many theories, including straightforward utilitarianism, lead to the Repugnant Conclusion, and theories that avoid it lead to different troubling results, let’s leave this concern to one side.
Eric Carlson, Consequentialism Reconsidered, p100 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995). Carlson got the idea and the name for the principle from Wlodek Rabinowicz. Gustav Arrhenius endorses this principle and uses it against Actualism in Arrhenius, Future Generations: a Challenge for Moral Theory, Uppsala University, 2000, as does John Broome, in Weighing Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
See my “’Cannot’ Implies “Not Ought”,” Philosophical Studies, 2006.
I am aware that this involves a fair bit of unrigorous picture-thinking. Incidentally, I think there may be cases where it is true that I do wrong by doing x, where I would have done wrong had I refrained from x, but where it is still true that I could have avoided wrongdoing. That is because there may be A-worlds that I can produce that are not the closest A-worlds to me. Worlds where I break the law by jaywalking are closer than worlds where I break the law by committing a great train robbery. It doesn’t follow that the latter are inaccessible to me. Consider now a malicious person, who is such that worlds where she swerves to the left to avoid hitting a pedestrian may be more distant than worlds where she swerves to the left to hit a pedestrian, but both are accessible to her.
See Consequentialism Reconsidered, p101.
See Krister Bykvist, “Violations of Normative Invariance: some thoughts on shifty oughts,” Theoria, forthcoming, for discussion of similar arguments. This paper came to my attention after my own paper was mostly completed.
He could have refrained from playing, of course. But suppose that here, unlike in real life, refraining is no better than playing and failing to win.
See my “The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism,” Utilias, 1997.
Jean-Paul Vessel, “Counterfactuals for Consequentialists,” Philosophical Studies, 112 2003 pp. 103–125.
See David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).
An objector may worry that these two examples assume a sort of objectivism about morality (in the sense of objective utilitarianism as opposed to expected utility utilitarianism.) Below I shall discuss an example that should be compelling both to objectivists and non-objectivists.
Hud Hudson thought of this example and the two that follow.
For an account of counterpart theory, see David K. Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 7 March 68; 65, 113–136. For an account of why it’s so controversial, see Trenton Merricks, “The End of Counterpart Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, 0 03, 100 (10), 521–549.
For some of the debate over altered past Compatibilism, see Jan Narveson, “Compatibilism Defended,” Philosophical Stuides, July 77, 83–87; John Martin Fischer, “Power over the Past,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, October 84; 65, 335–350; and Peter Forrest, “Backward Causation in Defense of Free Will,” Mind, April 85, 94, 210–217.
This is the promised example that should appeal both to those who accept, say, objective consequentialism, and those who accept expected utility consequentialism. In the case where the agent chooses to take the risk of pushing the button that has a 0.5 chance of causing $1,000 to be sent to OXFAM, this seems to be the right choice from the point of view of expected utility, and the right choice if, unbeknownst to the agent, the button he pushes will in fact lead to the $1,000 being sent to OXFAM.
For more on this idea, see Peter van Inwagen, “When is the Will Free?” Nous Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 1989; 3.
In Lewis “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,” Philosophical Papers II (Oxford U. Press, New York: 1996) p. 34.
See Parsons, Arrhenius, Narveson, op. cit.
Acknowledgment
Thanks to Ryan Wasserman, Ty Barnes, Ned Markosian, two anonymous referees for Philosophia, and especially, Hud Hudson for all the help. I am also grateful to Western Washington University for providing me with professional leave which enabled me to complete this project.
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Howard-Snyder, F. Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don’t!. Philosophia 36, 1–15 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9099-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9099-z