Abstract
Despite the fact that many of our beliefs are justified by perceptual experience, there is relatively little exploration of the connections between epistemic justification and perceptual content. This is unfortunate since it seems likely that some views of justification will require particular views of content, and the package of the two might be quite a bit less attractive than either view considered alone. I will argue that this is the case for epistemic internalism. In particular, epistemic internalism requires a view of perceptual content that results in an error theory of perception. This, in turn, hobbles the internalist’s account of perceptual justification. While there are various stages along the way at which one can resist the argument, each one will involve significant commitments that highlight heretofore unacknowledged connections between justification and content. Even if the internalist is willing to make these moves and resist the argument, the argument reveals a novel way for the epistemic externalist to resist one of internalism’s main arguments.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I owe this way of putting things to Jeremy Fantl.
The arguments in the previous paragraph owe a good deal to Siewert (1998).
See for example Block (2003).
For such a view see Tye (1995).
For such a view, see Dretske (1995).
For the swampman example, see Davidson (1987). The swampman is a being who is a molecule for molecule duplicate of a normal creature but who didn't evolve.
So are the inversion scenarios discussed in the next section. The phenomenal externalist will likewise have to deny inversion-like possibilities.
Would this combination block my overall argument? Only to the extent that the phenomenal externalist will be able to handle intuitions about the possibility of spectrum inversion, etc. My suspicion, though, is that someone committed to rejecting the possibility of swamp-worlds won't have too much problem rejecting the possibility of spectrum inversion.
The material in this section draws heavily from Howell (2013).
One possible view would hold that there is a primitive connection between the phenomenology of the experiential state and some color property in the world—either one that is natural, or some primitive “edenic” color. Jack would be right if he had that connection and Jill would be right if she did. While possible, such a view owes us an account of that connection and the corresponding property. Without that, it seems an uncomfortable place in logical space. Horgan et al. (2004) hold something similar to this view, but it succumbs to the error theory when it comes to secondary qualities. It plausibly stands more of a chance when it comes to qualities like shape, but to make that case they would need to answer the arguments below, drawn from Thompson (2010).
It's worth noting that one way out of the Jack/Jill example, indexing the colors to perceiver types instead of individual perceivers, fails in the case of JackT and JillT since they are different perceiver types.
Thompson (2009).
For an argument to this effect see Howell (2013).
There are other possible Fregean views, but this is the sort of view suggested by Thompson and Chalmers.
One can imagine the Fregean responding that there is a way the world could be to make the content accurate. It would be for this phenomenal character to be reliably caused by the property that caused it. This is truly an empty content, though, since it is compatible the experience representing any possible property. Such a content would thus say next to nothing about the world—this would, I take it, be as bad a result for the internalist as the error theory.
Objection: It doesn’t seem so absurd that the Fregean view sometimes has the result that there are sometimes no extensionally specifiable accuracy conditions. The Fregean view is indexical, and don’t such problems plague any indexical view of thought or linguistic content? The answer is that this depends on how the indexicals achieve reference in these other cases. Similar objections have been raised to various views of indexical content (see Austin 1990, for example). In any case, we must decide whether perceptual content is in fact indexical, and the argument here is that it is particularly hard to see how a constant perceptual experience could fail to make it seem to the subject that a particular property is being instantiated. Thanks to a referee of this journal for this objection.
A referee for this journal suggests that pairing a two-dimensional view of belief [of the sort adopted by Chalmers (1996)] with a Fregean picture of perception might offer the internalist a stable position. Pursing this idea is a worthy enterprise, but I am skeptical. Presumably the indexical Fregean content would compose part of the primary intension which is the belief content that would concern the epistemic internalist. But if the arguments here are right, that content doesn’t give the internalist the sort of accuracy conditions she wants. In other words, two dimensionalism will help only if the internalist can already solve her problem with Fregean content.
This was Terry Horgan’s response to an earlier version of this paper in his comments at the 2012 Pacific Division APA meeting.
See Thompson (2009) and Chalmers (2012) for the defense of the view about primary qualities. They are inclined to take a Fregean way out. To me this seems even less plausible than in the case of colors, since it would make the perceptions of people in the evil demon world veridical. But my Modus Tollens is Chalmers' Modus Ponens as we see in Chalmers (2005).
See Pryor (2000).
See Moore (1939).
Wright (2004).
Cohen (1999).
See, for example, Howell (2013) for an approach like this.
I don't think the internalist can avoid the whole issue of phenomenal content by simply insisting that justification supervenes on phenomenal character. This would be unmotivated. Why would justification supervene on a subject's phenomenal character instead of his hair color? Because phenomenal character and not hair color has to do with the way the world appears to the subject. That is, it is only so far as phenomenal character is connected with phenomenal content that the former is relevant to justification. If that's the case, ways in which the two come apart have to be considered. Thanks to Eli Chudnoff for forcing me to respond to this possibility.
References
Austin, D. (1990). What is the meaning of ‘This’. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Block, N. (1990). Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 53–79.
Block, N. (2003). Mental paint. In Reflections and replies: Essays on the philosophy of tyler burge, 165–200. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review, 110(2), 199–240.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2005). The matrix as metaphysics. In C. Grau (Ed.), Philosophers explore the matrix. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2006). Perception and the fall from Eden.” In Perceptual experience, 49–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (2012). The character of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, S. (1984). Justification and truth. Philosophical Studies, 46(3), 279–295.
Cohen, S. (1999). Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons. Philosophical Perspectives, 13(s13), 57–89.
Davidson, D. (1987). Knowing one’s own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60(3), 441–458.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Egan, A. (2006). Appearance properties? Noûs, 40(3), 495–521.
Fitelson, B. (2010). Strengthening the case for knowledge from falsehood. Analysis, 70(4), 666–669.
Goldman, A. I. (1979). What is justified belief. In E. Sosa & K. Jaegwon (Eds.), Epistemology. An anthology (pp. 340–353). New York: Blackwell.
Hill, C. S. (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horgan, T., Tienson, J., & Graham, G. (2004). Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a Vat. In R, Schantz (Ed.), The externalist challenge. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Howell, R. J. (2013). Perception from the first-person perspective. European Journal of Philosophy. doi:10.1111/ejop.12065.
Moore, G. E. (1939). Proof of an external world. Proceedings of the British Academy, 25, 273–300.
Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs, 34(4), 517–8211.
Shoemaker, S. (2001). Introspection and phenomenal character. Philosophical Topics, 28(2), 247–273.
Siewert, C. (1998). The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Thompson, B. J. (2007). Shoemaker on phenomenal content. Philosophical Studies, 135(3), 307–334.
Thompson, B. J. (2009). Senses for senses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(1), 99–2013.
Thompson, B. J. (2010). The spatial content of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1), 146–184.
Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness: A representational theory of the phenomenal mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color, and content (Vol. 113. 3). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2002). Visual qualia and visual content revisited. In Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Warfield, T. (2005). Knowledge from falsehood. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 405–416.
Wright, C. (2004). Warrant for nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 78(1), 167–8211.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to my colleagues at SMU and my commentators and audience at the 2012 Pacific Division Meeting of the APA. In particular I’d like to thank Eric Barnes, Philippe Chuard, Eli Chudnoff, Kevan Edwards, Doug Ehring, Justin Fisher, Terrence Horgan, Matt Lockard, Jack Lyons, Nico Orlandi, and Brad Thompson.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Howell, R.J. Epistemic internalism and perceptual content: how a fear of demons leads to an error theory of perception. Philos Stud 172, 2153–2170 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0403-z
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0403-z