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Shallow versus deep response-dependence

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Abstract

This paper explores a distinction between two types of response-dependence (RD) account (shallow vs. deep). This distinction is inherent in much of the existing literature, however it is neither widely nor well understood, and has never been drawn explicitly. The distinction is often taken to be a metaphysical, or ‘realism-relevant’ one—i.e. deep RD accounts entail qualified realism (or perhaps anti-realism), while shallow RD accounts are metaphysically neutral. I argue that the distinction is not reliably realism-relevant. I formulate a weaker version of the distinction that may help prevent some common and understandable confusion about RD biconditionals and their relationship to realism. The weaker distinction rests on the different roles assigned to RD biconditionals by the two types of account.

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Notes

  1. See e.g. Locke (1690) and McDowell (2001).

  2. I take the canonical texts to be Pettit (1991), Wright (1992) and Johnston (1993).

  3. Johnston (1993, p. 107). Emphasis added.

  4. I prefer a subjunctive formulation, though some prefer dispositional formulations. For detailed discussion of the differences see Busck (2006, p. 177).

  5. Pettit (1998, p. 65).

  6. Johnston (1993) presents a metaphysically-loaded deep account, Pettit (1991) a metaphysically-neutral shallow account. See Brynjarsdóttir (2008) for example for corroboration of these characterisations.

  7. In what follows I intend to prescind from the issue of whether realism genuinely requires the possibility of mind-independent essentialism. This is not to deny either its importance or its controversial status. Rather, I see this discussion is an important preliminary or accompaniment, and one that is (a) of interest independently of that issue and (b) may serve to facilitate that debate or make it clearer or more tractable.

  8. Johnston likes to describe the resulting position as ‘qualified realism’ because it occupies a space somewhere between the traditional extremes of Platonism and projectivism. That is, it is a compromise between the idea that value properties (say) exist completely independently of our responses, and the idea that they are nothing more than the projection of our subjective responses onto the world. As one advocate puts it, the deep account represents a sort of mid-point, because it is saying that ‘the objects of our judgements actually are the bearers of value properties’ whilst denying that ‘those properties can be understood in any way except in relation to our value responses’. See Lebar, M. (2005, p. 175).

  9. Again, see Brynjarsdóttir (2008). I also cover this in more detail in Sect. 1.

  10. Esp. Powell (1998) and perhaps Devitt (2006).

  11. Pettit (2004, p. 8). See also Stalnaker (2004).

  12. Pettit (1998, p. 61).

  13. For arguments that the deep account is incompatible with realism see Powell (1998) or the literature on Johnston’s ‘Missing Explanation Argument’.

  14. Blackburn (1993, p. 262).

  15. Loc. Cit. Note that there’s an oddity in Blackburn’s choice of example. Traditionally the right hand side of an RD biconditional features some kind of mind-dependent subjective response, but as I note again later, there is nothing ‘mind-dependent’ about the response on the right hand side of (P). My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.

  16. See Pettit (1991, p. 617) and (1998, p. 63).

  17. Op. Cit. p. 262.

  18. A difference in our physiology might have altered its effects or there might have been other substances that played the same role.

  19. Loc. Cit.

  20. For the curious, the passage is in Kripke (1980, p. 35).

  21. Lebar (2005, p. 186).

  22. Mark Johnston for example, see Johnston (1993).

  23. Ibid. p. 177.

  24. I explore what happens when we regard them as (conceptually) contingent, as do most proponents of the shallow account in Sect. 4.

  25. As mentioned above, this is similar in structure to Mark Powell’s (1998) argument, though that argument targets Wright’s ‘euthyphronism’. I say more about this in Sect. 5.

  26. Note that it’s important to change the example to a concept like red where the effects on the right hand side of the biconditional are plausibly mind-dependent. This is not the case with Blackburn’s (P). See footnote 15.

  27. Again, I am not concerned here with whether there might be a kind of realism that doesn’t require essentialism, though I recognise this may be an important issue further along the line in defending the compatibility of realism and RD.

  28. See Kripke (1980) and relevant discussion in Wright (1998, p. 22) and Wright (2002, p. 409). The latter paper is what prompts Hale’s remarks below.

  29. Hale (forthcoming), emphasis added.

  30. Haukioja (2001, p. 116). Pettit likes to add a rigidifying device to the biconditional (‘in the actual world’), with the effect that it becomes metaphysically necessary. I talk more about necessity and rigidity in Sect. 6.

  31. For example, Joseph LaPorte uses the phrase ‘standard view’ to describe this in his entry on Rigid Designation in the Stanford Encyclopedia (2006).

  32. This may not apply to shallow accounts like Pettit’s, where there are rigidifying devices within the biconditional—see footnote 30.

  33. See Busck (2006, p. 44) for extensive critical discussion of this broadly ‘functionalist’ approach to the RD debate.

  34. See Wright (1992, p. 117). This is for reasons connected to the conditional fallacy, which I will not address here. Also, PB must meet four conditions for a concept to be response-dependent: a prioricity, substantiality, independence and the extremal condition. These are not important for my purposes.

  35. See e.g. Wright (1992, p. 122).

  36. Wright (1998, p. 17).

  37. Loc. Cit.

  38. See Johnston (1993, p. 103).

  39. Cited in Lebar (2005, p. 178).

  40. Pettit (1991, p. 612).

  41. Wright (1992, p. 115).

  42. Lopez de Sa (2003) suggests that the distinction between rigidly and flexibly response-dependent properties maps onto the realist/anti-realist debate. Specifically, he argues that rigid biconditionals will be appropriate for more ‘real’ RD properties (such as red), while flexible biconditionals will be appropriate for less robustly ‘real’ properties (such as nauseating). I regret I cannot address this more fully here. I take it this approach may speak to the issue of the degree of objectivity one can attach to RD properties. However, I suspect it may not speak to the issue of whether RD is consistent with the robust kind of realism represented by mind-independent essentialism.

  43. Note that Johnston (1993) wants to allow for both descriptive and revisionary readings of the deep account. This formulation is suitable for the descriptive account, whereas for the revisionary account it would say instead ‘the concept of the property F that we ought to adopt underwrites…’ etc.

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Acknowledgement

I am indebted to an anonymous referee for invaluable critical comments on this paper. I would also like to thank Chris Hookway, Rob Hopkins, Alex Miller, Bob Hale, Joe Morrison, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, and Ejya Brynjarsdóttir for invaluable inspiration, conversation or commentary on earlier drafts.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

    Andrew William Howat

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Howat, A.W. Shallow versus deep response-dependence. Philos Stud 156, 155–172 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9593-1

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