Skip to main content
Log in

The skeptic, the content externalist, and the theist

  • Published:
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is that such a strong consequence is not desirable for the content-externalists, and that the availability of this argument therefore casts doubt on the anti-skeptical position. I argue that all content externalists should be troubled by this result, since even those philosophers who do not endorse the anti-skeptical strategy must either reject the possibility of a creationist god or admit that their thesis does not hold a priori for minds in general.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Baker, L. R. (forthcoming). First-person externalism. The Modern Schoolman.

  • Bilgrami A. (1992) Belief and meaning. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Brueckner, A. (1992). Semantic answers to skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 73, 200–219. (Reprinted in DeRose, K., & Warfield, T. (1999). Skepticism: a contemporary reader (pp. 43–60). Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  • Burge T. (1979) Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–122

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burge T. (1988) Individualism and self-knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy LXXXV 11: 649–663

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson D. (1975) Thought and talk. In: Guttenplan S. (eds) Mind and language. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 7–24

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F (eds) (1981) Knowledge and the flow of information. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Forbes, G. (1995). Realism and Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy, 92, 205–222. (Reprinted in DeRose, K., & Warfield, T. (1999). Skepticism: a contemporary reader (pp. 43–60). Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  • Hoffman J., Rosenkrantz G. S. (2002) The divine attributes. Blackwell, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke S. (1982) Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga A. (1974) The nature of necessity. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H. (1975) The meaning of meaning. In: Putnam H. (eds) Mind, language and reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H. (1981) Reason truth and history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H. (1992a) Replies. Philosophical Topics 20: 347–408

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H. (1992b) Renewing philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker R. (1987) Inquiry. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker R. (1999) Context and content. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Warfield, T. (1998). A priori knowledge of the world. Philosophical Studies, 92(1–2), 127–147.(Reprinted in DeRose, K., & Warfield, T. (1999). Skepticism: a contemporary reader (pp. 43–60). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Robert Howell.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Howell, R. The skeptic, the content externalist, and the theist. Int J Philos Relig 69, 173–180 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-010-9261-6

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-010-9261-6

Keywords

Navigation