Abstract
John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.
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Notes
See my (2001, pp. 98–115) and (2007a) for elaboration. The “relevant” beliefs are beliefs that are not based upon self-deception, faith, or the like. I assume that beliefs based upon self-deception, etc., are not plausible candidates for being epistemically justified. I assume also that only if PC is true can appearances be a source of justification, because PC, as formulated in the text here, seems to be the weakest view worth considering that attributes justificatory force to appearance. See my (2007a) for discussion of views that attribute justificatory power to only some appearances.
DePoe (2010).
I assume familiarity with both Phenomenal Conservatism and the Acquaintance Theory here. On the Acquaintance Theory, see Russell (1997, Chaps. 5, 9), Fumerton (1995, pp. 73–79). On Fumerton’s view, acquaintance is a relation between a person and the object of acquaintance, and unlike appearances, it is not an intentional state.
The Simple Acquaintance Theory is probably Russell’s view. The Triple Acquaintance Theory is the view of both Fumerton and DePoe.
Fumerton (2005, p. 123) cites a similar case as one in which a subject has a pain without being acquainted with it.
Churchland (1988, pp. 77–8).
BonJour (1985, p. 41).
The distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeaters derives from Pollock and Cruz (1999, pp. 196–197), though I have given a broader characterization of undercutting defeaters than theirs.
Huemer (2007b, forthcoming).
BonJour (1985, pp. 43–44), emphasis BonJour’s.
See Fumerton (1995, pp. 60–66) for discussion of the meaning of “internalism”, including an alternate characterization of the view. See also my (2006), where I propose another definition of internalism: internalism is the view that what one has justification for believing supervenes on the way things appear to one.
This argument is explained and defended in my (2006).
See my (2007a, pp. 47–48).
I would like to thank John DePoe and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for helpful comments on the manuscript.
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Huemer, M. Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat: a reply to DePoe. Philos Stud 156, 1–13 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9584-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9584-2