Wolfgang Huemer The Character of a Name: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare I do not think Shakespeare could have reflected on the “lot of the poet”. Neither could he regard himself as a prophet or teacher of humanity. People regard him with amazement almost as a spectacle of nature. They do not have the feeling that this brings them into contact with a great human being. Rather with a phenomenon. I think that, in order to enjoy a poet, you have to like the culture to which he belongs as well. If you are indifferent to this or repelled by it, your admiration cools off. (VB 1998, p. 96) In Wittgenstein’s Nachlass we find altogether seven remarks in which he mentions the name of Shakespeare, most of which were composed quite late.¹ All of them have been included by the editors of the posthumously compiled volume Culture and Value. Wittgenstein does not leave many doubts concerning his judgment on the bard. While he seems to have liked some performances of Shakespeare’s plays² and even considered using a quote from King Lear as a motto for the Philosophical Investigations³, the tone of the remarks is rather negative: “Shakespeare’s similes are, in the ordinary sense, bad” (VB 1998, p. 56), he shows us human passions “in a dance, not naturalistically” (VB 1998, p. 42), he “is not true to life [naturwahr]” (VB 1998, p. 95), and “high-handed” (VB 1998, p. 56)⁴; “I understand how someone may admire this & call it supreme art, but I don’t 1 One dates from 1939, two from 1946, one from 1949, and 3 from 1950. There are other places where he quotes from, or alludes to, texts by Shakespeare (for a detailed list, cf. Biesenbach 2011, p. 351–357), and in letters or conversations Wittgenstein occasionally comments on performances of plays he has seen. In all the places I know, he does not discuss the quality of Shakespeare’s texts, though. I will come back to this point below. 2 John King recalls to have talked with Wittgenstein in the early 1930s about a performance of King Lear at the Marlowe Society (1984, p. 73), probably the same of which Wittgenstein says in conversation with Drury, dated “1930(?)”, that it was a “most moving experience” (1984, p. 117). O.K. Bouwsma reports a conversation of some twenty years later, in September 1950, where Wittgenstein speaks about a “performance of Lear put on by students in Cambridge – the best Shakespeare he ever saw” (Bouwsma, 1986, p. 65). In March 1917, he mentions a performance of A Midsummer Night’s Dream in a letter to Engelmann. And in June 1950, he writes about another performance of the same play in a letter to Koder, complaining that it was ruined by the director. 3 Cf. Drury (1984, p. 157). 4 In the German original, Wittgenstein speaks of his “Selbstherrlichkeit,” which in Winch’s translation of VB is rendered as “arbitrariness.” It seems to me, however, that “high-handedness” is more truthful to the German text. PENULTIMATE DRAFT The article appeared in: Wittgenstein Reading. Sascha Bru, Wolfgang Huemer and Daniel Steuer (eds), Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013, pp. 23–37. (Please quote from the printed version). 24 Wolfgang Huemer like it.” (VB 1998, p. 98). Wittgenstein seems to find Shakespeare cold, distant, and detached: “‘Beethoven’s great heart’ – no one could say ‘Shakespeare’s great heart’” (VB 1998, p. 96); “I could only stare in wonder at Shakespeare; never do anything with him” (VB 1998, p. 95); “someone who admires him as one admires Beethoven, say, seems to me to misunderstand Shakespeare” (VB 1998, p. 98). And accordingly Wittgenstein is also ill at ease with those who like Shakespeare’s work: “I am deeply suspicious of most of Shakespeare’s admirers” (VB 1998, p. 95). Wittgenstein’s harsh judgment on Shakespeare has been quite surprising and disturbing to many. George Steiner, for example, wrote an article a few years after the publication of Culture and Value, where he suggests that “Wittgenstein misreads Shakespeare” (Steiner 1995, p. 128), and comes to the conclusion that a “great logician and epistemologist can be a blind reader of literature” (Steiner 1995, p. 127).⁵ Even scholars more familiar with Wittgenstein’s work seem to be puzzled by the remarks, many of Wittgenstein’s biographers hardly mention them, and when Brian McGuinness briefly characterizes Wittgenstein’s view of Shakespeare, he chooses very selectively from the passages of the Nachlass in a way that can make the reader believe that Wittgenstein thought highly of Shakespeare.⁶ Wittgenstein’s literary taste is often described as traditional. Hence, it does not come as a complete surprise that his claims about Shakespeare have bewildered many scholars. He liked to read the German, Austrian, and Russian classics, so why should he dismiss the poet who is considered the point of reference of the English literary tradition, i.e., the tradition of the country where he chose to live? There must have been some reason why Wittgenstein wrote these remarks, a reason which would explain his judgment. But, I want to suggest, we will not find it in the remarks themselves. In order to gain a better understanding, we should rather analyze them in the broader context of his overall Nachlass. In this article I aim to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on Shakespeare can give us an important key for reading the occasional references to poets, composers, and other exponents of Western culture which we find in his Nachlass. Wittgenstein, I will argue, often uses the names of these individuals to stake out his own cultural background, to show the reader something about himself, as it were, as if 5 For a more detailed discussion of Steiner’s critique cf. Huemer (2012). 6 Cf. McGuinness (1988, p. 36): Shakespeare was “a unique figure in Western culture, he [Wittgenstein] thought, like nature or a landscape, a creator rather than a poet perhaps because he was not a moral teacher.” The Character of a Name: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare 25 he wanted to sketch a portrait of (some aspects of) himself. My reading is inspired by the following remark: It’s as if the word that I understand had a definite slight aroma that corresponds to my understanding of it. As if two familiar words were distinguished for me not merely by their sound or their appearance, but by an atmosphere as well, even when I don’t imagine anything in connexion with them. – But remember how the names of famous poets and composers seem to have taken up a peculiar meaning into themselves. So that one can say: the names “Beethoven” and “Mozart” don’t merely sound different; no, they are also accompanied by a different character. (RPP 1980a, § 243) Wittgenstein, I want to suggest, often uses the names of poets and composers not primarily to refer to the actual persons, but rather to evoke in the informed reader a certain aroma or atmosphere that allows her to better grasp Wittgenstein’s cultural background and, in consequence, his philosophy. This is not to deny, of course, that there are places where he shows interest in a concrete artist or in discussing her work (as many contributions to the present volume show). In many remarks, however, Wittgenstein just mentions names without further explanation – like in the ones on Shakespeare; it is particularly in these passages, I want to suggest, that Wittgenstein tries to exploit the “character” of the names mentioned in order to make himself understood or to say something about himself.⁷ Of course, the 7 Wittgenstein uses this strategy not only in his remarks on Shakespeare, though; we find enigmatic references throughout his work. Take, for example, the remark: “I think good Austrian work (Grillparzer, Lenau, Bruckner, Labor) is particularly hard to understand. There is a sense in which it is subtler than anything else and its truth never leans towards possibility” (VB 1998, p. 5). Not only is it quite enigmatic (“hard to understand”) what Wittgenstein wants to say, he also does not explain what the four poets and composers have in common and why he mentions them and not others. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s strategy is not limited to composers and poets; I think that it is also at work in the often-quoted passage where he lists the persons who have most influenced him: I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else & I have done no more than passionately take it up for my work of clarification. That is how Boltzmann Hertz Schopenhauer Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos Weininger Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me. Can one take Breuer and Freud as an example of Jewish reproductive thinking? – What I invent are new comparisons. (VB 1998, p. 16) This remark is but a name-dropping that only sets some landmarks, but does not explain at all how Wittgenstein was influenced by the persons mentioned: it is illuminating only for those who are able to grasp the “character” of the names. This seems to be particularly true when Wittgenstein mentions “Breuer” and “Freud” at the end of this remark. In doing so he seems to succeed in making clearer where he actually wants to arrive at in this remark. 26 Wolfgang Huemer two aspects – referring to a person and exploiting the character of this person’s name – do not exclude one another; the latter aspect does become more obvious when the reference to the actual person does not seem to play an important role.⁸ 1. Some Characteristics of Wittgenstein’s Remarks It might be useful to begin the discussion with highlighting some characteristics of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Shakespeare. In particular, I think the following points are worth noting: 1.1. Wittgenstein does not discuss a single work of Shakespeare, he does not mention concrete stylistic characteristics, nor does he support his claims with examples or quotations. Given the confident tone of Wittgenstein’s critique, it is quite remarkable that he does not even mention, let alone discuss, any of the poet’s works – his critique rather concerns Shakespeare’s style in general. Most of the remarks are quite enigmatic and short; Wittgenstein does not even try to explain his judgment or to illustrate it with quotations. Moreover, he does not make any effort to show textual knowledge, which he undoubtedly had.⁹ Rather than specific works he seems to have in mind the “phenomenon” Shakespeare: at several places he criticizes that from Shakespeare’s work there does not emerge a concrete or admirable personality, it does not bring the reader “into contact with a great human being” (VB 1998, p. 96). He does praise Shakespeare’s “supple hand” (VB 1998, p. 96) which, as he hastens to add, does not allow the reader to come into contact with the poet, though, but rather leaves them speechless. “I could only stare in wonder at Shakespeare, but never do anything with him” (VB 1998, p. 95). In short, it is the poet Shakespeare, but not Shakespeare’s poetry that Wittgenstein is talking about. 8 I want to thank Daniel Steuer for helping me to clarify this point. 9 Wittgenstein talks about particular plays only in letters and conversations with friends, typically when speaking about performances of Shakespeare’s plays he had attended (cf. fn. 2 above). On such occasions, his remarks on Shakespeare also have a negative ring. Bouwsma, for example, recalls him saying that “for Shakespeare he hasn’t much use. Some for Lear” (Bouwsma 1986, p. 47). There are some hints that in conversations he occasionally discussed formal aspects of Shakespeare’s plays (cf., for example, Drury 1984, p. 132), but we do not have a detailed record of these conversations. The Character of a Name: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare 27 1.2. More than in Shakespeare himself, Wittgenstein seems to be interested in the reaction that Shakespeare’s work causes in the audience or reader. In six of the seven remarks¹⁰, Wittgenstein discusses explicitly how people react to Shakespeare and wonders what would have to be the case in order for someone to be able to admire his work. At several places Wittgenstein insinuates that a lot of the admiration for Shakespeare is not the result of a genuine enthusiasm brought about by an actual encounter with the texts, but rather of a widespread convention that has become entrenched in a specific culture. In one place he connects this point with an attack on academic literary criticism: “But of course I don’t mean to deny by this that an enormous amount of praise has been & still is lavished on Shakespeare without understanding & for specious reasons by a thousand professors of literature” (VB 1998, p. 55). Wittgenstein talks about his being “deeply suspicious of most of Shakespeare’s admirers” (VB 1998, p. 95) and plays with the thought “that praising him has been a matter of convention, even though I have to tell myself that this is not the case” (VB 1998, p. 55). Even in a remark where Wittgenstein shows understanding for the motives of those who admire Shakespeare’s work “and call it supreme art,” he does so only to confront their reaction with his own by adding the words: “but I don’t like it” (VB 1998, p. 98). In short, Wittgenstein is interested in Shakespeare as a cultural or social phenomenon and in the way people react to this phenomenon, and not in Shakespeare as a concrete person or poet. 1.3. When discussing the quality of Shakespeare’s work, Wittgenstein almost always does so in the conditional mode. Wittgenstein never formulates an outright judgment on Shakespeare’s works, but rather reports his own reaction to it; at some places he hypothetically assumes that Shakespeare is great, very often in the attempt to understand those who admire his works. This seems to suggest that Wittgenstein is not primarily interested in the (objective) aesthetic and literary qualities of Shakespeare’s work, but rather in the reaction it provokes and to confront the reaction of those who admire Shakespeare with his own.¹¹ 1.4. Wittgenstein never compares the work of Shakespeare with that of another poet. Wittgenstein limits himself to stating where, in his view, Shakespeare has got 10 The only exception is the first remark, where Wittgenstein elaborates an idea he attributes to Paul Engelmann. 11 Wittgenstein’s remarks on Shakespeare show clearly, as Jonathan Pugh highlights in his (2012, p. 246), that for Wittgenstein “the aesthetic reactions we have and the causal explanations we assign them are quite different from one another.” 28 Wolfgang Huemer things wrong, but he does not explain this failure by contrasting him with a poet who succeeded where – according to Wittgenstein – Shakespeare has failed.¹² The only positive counter-example Wittgenstein mentions is Beethoven, whom he presents as the prototype of an artist one can actually get in touch with, and for whom one can find genuine enthusiasm: “someone who admires him as one admires Beethoven, say, seems to me to misunderstand Shakespeare” (VB 1998, p. 98). It is quite telling that for Wittgenstein it is a composer who succeeds where the poet fails. I will briefly come back to this point below. 2. The Remarks and their Context: Wittgenstein’s Literary Style These four points clearly show that Wittgenstein does not aim at contributing to a discussion on the aesthetic or literary qualities of Shakespeare’s work. We could even go so far as to state that in a sense Wittgenstein’s remarks on Shakespeare are not about Shakespeare, nor are they about his work: Wittgenstein focuses on reactions – his own and that of others – to the poet. He does not try to justify his views, nor does he make any attempt to prove their adequacy or to convince the reader of their correctness. When reporting his reaction to Shakespeare and his admirers, Wittgenstein shares something about himself with the reader. In a way, Wittgenstein seems to be more interested in writing about himself than in discussing Shakespeare or his works. It seems significant (though not untypical) that Wittgenstein does not systematically elaborate his views on Shakespeare, but exposes them occasionally like short observations scattered in the body of his (later) notebooks – just like someone who, in many discussions with a good friend, occasionally comes back to remark on a specific topic. This, of course, does not make these remarks stand out from the body of Wittgenstein’s later work, which is composed entirely of short remarks. Many of these remarks remind us of a dialogue, but, unlike the interlocutors in, say, Plato’s dialogues, Wittgenstein does not introduce a concrete person, he never uses a name to address his interlocutor, nor do the remarks allow us to recognize a concrete personality with clearly defined views. 12 The only other poet he mentions in these remarks is Milton, but only to say that he considers him to be an incorruptible authority, and therefore takes his judgment on Shakespeare to be sincere. The Character of a Name: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare 29 Wittgenstein rather seems to allow us to witness an inner dialogue or invite the reader to identify with the interlocutor. In short: this stylistic aspect of Wittgenstein’s later writings allows the reader to feel a certain degree of familiarity with the philosopher.¹³ Wittgenstein, as is well known, has adopted an aphoristic style from early on, choosing concise statements over long-winded explanations or argumentations, which can make his writings seem arcane. Moreover, during various periods of his work, he states explicitly that he does not aim at convincing the reader of his philosophical position, but rather at presenting his thoughts and making them accessible to the sympathetic reader who is likely to share them. Already in the first paragraph of the introduction to his first published book, the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, for example, he states: Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it – or at least similar thoughts. – So it is not a textbook. – Its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it. (TLP 1961, p. 3) The goal of the book, if we can believe Wittgenstein’s own words, is not to argue a philosophical position, but rather to afford pleasure to those who read it with understanding and who have already had the thoughts expressed in the book. This is a quite unusual goal for a philosophical book, the main purpose of which typically is not to afford pleasure, but to contribute to a scientific, or rational, debate, to add to the readers’ knowledge by offering new thoughts, i.e., thoughts they have not yet had, and which are justified with elaborate arguments that often are difficult to grasp. Literary texts are typically thought to be more likely to afford pleasure to the reader than philosophical ones. In later periods of his life Wittgenstein is also quite explicit about the fact that he does not want to teach or indoctrinate; he does not want “to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own” (PI 1967, p. x), a goal which may explain the lack of explicit arguments. Elaborating an argument explicitly and step by step, however, serves not only to justify one’s claim, but can also provide a key for the reader (who has not yet had the thoughts in question) to better understand the position presented, i.e., to individuate the motives that have led to its formulation, to grasp its significance, and to assess the consequences it entails, etc. 13 I discuss this aspect in more detail in my (2013). 30 Wolfgang Huemer Wittgenstein does not seem to care very much about any of these aspects. He rather accepts that his texts will be difficult to follow. In a draft for a preface that he wrote in 1930/31 and that was included in VB 1998 he states explicitly: “This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it is written” (VB 1998, p. 8). Wittgenstein does not seem to mind that this might be a small group only, nor does he seem to make any attempts at enlarging it; he seems deliberately to exclude all those who do not belong to this group. Wittgenstein writes: For if a book has been written for only a few readers that will be clear just from the fact that only a few understand it. The book must automatically separate those who understand it & those who do not. (VB 1998, p. 10) This should not make us believe that Wittgenstein is about to form an esoteric circle to which only a handful of illuminated can find access. He rather means to set apart the spirit, in which the book was written, from “that of the prevailing European and American civilization,” i.e., a civilization that “is characterized by the word progress. Progress is its form, it is not one of its properties that it makes progress” (VB 1998, p. 8f). Wittgenstein feels deeply alienated from this civilization. He describes himself as someone who does not partake in it and can look at it only from outside: I contemplate the current of European civilization without sympathy, without understanding its aims, if any. So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe. (VB 1998, p. 9) Wittgenstein, thus, suggests that he does not write primarily to promote his views, nor to attract the attention of a broader audience, but rather to share his thoughts with those who, like himself, feel alienated from our current civilization that is characterized by progress, and who do not aim to “order one thought to the others in a series” but rather keep “aiming at the same place” (VB 1998, p. 10). Wittgenstein does not feel at home in this civilization and seems to look for an exchange with those who also feel foreign to it. The oppositional pair home/ foreign becomes quite important only a few pages later, where Wittgenstein tries to better characterize the group of people he is writing for: If I say that my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if that can be called a circle) I do not mean to say that this circle is in my view the élite of mankind but it is the circle to which I turn (not because they are better or worse than the others but) because they form my cultural circle, as it were my fellow countrymen in contrast to the others who are foreign to me. (VB 1998, p. 12–13) The Character of a Name: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare 31 Whether or not one will find access to Wittgenstein’s texts depends, in other words, on whether or not one is one of his fellow countrymen.¹⁴ It might surprise that Wittgenstein uses the word “countrymen” – in the original German he uses the expression “Menschen meines Vaterlandes” – for it seems quite obvious that he does not intend to say that only Austrians will understand him. Moreover, there are no indications whatsoever that Wittgenstein uses the term “Vaterland” with the purpose to exploit the political connotations with which it was often used at the time. It is worth noting that in all his Nachlass he uses this expression in only one other place, where he suggests that one cannot chose one’s “Vaterland.”¹⁵ In this passage, the expression “fellow countrymen,” thus, seems to refer to people who have been born and acculturated in the same country as oneself, who speak the same language and partake in the same set of social and cultural practices. One cannot choose one’s fatherland as one cannot choose one’s first language; it is not a culture that one chooses among many, but into which one grows over time. We should keep in mind, however, that once grown up, i.e., once acculturated and in possession of a first language, one can choose to learn a second language and move to another country. An Austrian who moves to England will remain Austrian in the sense that he will continue to understand German and retain traits of the culture in which he grew up, but he will also learn to understand and express himself in English, to decipher characteristic cultural references, to adopt customs and partake in practices that are typical for the new culture, and get to know opinions that are widely accepted there. All this will broaden, but not replace, his original cultural background. This is not to suggest, of course, 14 Wittgenstein’s feeling of being alien is most interestingly discussed by James C. Klagge in his (2011), which I could access only when the work on this article was nearly finished. In the present article I am interested in showing how Wittgenstein’s feeling of being alien is mirrored in the style of his writing, but also in emphasizing that his feeling of being an outsider also comes with the feeling of belonging to a small group of people who find themselves in a similar situation: Wittgenstein is “exiled from his home culture and alienated from his civilizational surrounding” (Klagge 2011, p. 167), but he also feels at home in a “small circle of people” (VB 1998, p. 12) and he tries to delineate this circle with his references to poets and composers, etc.; especially with those references where he mainly exploits the aroma or character associated with the names; for they show his own location in and his perspective on a particular cultural landscape. 15 “‘Fatherlandless rabble’ (applied to the Jews) is on the same level as ‘crook-nosed rabble,’ for giving yourself a fatherland is just as little in your power, as it is to give yourself a particular nose” (Wittgenstein 2003, p. 125). The remark was written on November 2, 1931. I am following the translation proposed by David Stern in his (2001, p. 261) who translates “Vaterland” with “fatherland” rather than “country.” 32 Wolfgang Huemer that there is one homogeneous British culture, nor that one needs to emigrate to broaden one’s cultural background: whenever, in the exchange with other persons, one gets to know a new perspective or a different point of view, one comes to have a choice between adopting this new perspective or continuing to see the world the way one used to. So while it is true that one is borne into a specific fatherland, it is also true that – within certain limits – one is free to enlarge its borders, as it were, by broadening one’s cultural background in a certain direction and to develop in ways that one is free to choose. Depending on one’s starting point, these choices will determine the cultural circle to which one belongs, i.e., the group of people with whom one shares a relevant number of cultural references, views, and practices; they become, to use Wittgenstein’s metaphor, fellow countrymen. And while for some people geographic vicinity might be the most important criterion to consider another person as a fellow countryman, others might have more complex criteria, in these case their circle will likely be composed of “friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe” (VB 1998, p. 9). How can one identify a fellow countryman, how does one recognize that another person belongs to one’s own cultural circle? Typically this is not an overly complicated task; in general, one does so as soon as one hears them speak one’s own language, dialect, or sociolect. Whether or not a person belongs to one’s cultural circle will become evident by his or her references to a shared cultural framework. It suffices, in short, to listen to the person, to hear how she speaks and what she says, to understand whether she is “one of us” – without there being a need for a specific key, a secret code word, or anything similar. Wittgenstein explicitly discusses – and refutes – the idea of a specific key that allows only a certain group of people to approach the work: If you do not want certain people to get into a room, put a lock on it for which they do not have a key. But it is senseless to talk with them about it, unless you want them all the same to admire the room from outside! The decent thing to do is: put a lock on the doors that attracts only those who are able to open it & is not noticed by the rest. (VB 1998, p. 10) Those of Wittgenstein’s remarks which contain references to poets, composers, architects, and other creative artists, and in which he only hints at what he thinks of their achievements, might just be so many locks that Wittgenstein has installed – and that can be recognized only by those who are able to open them. It seems to me that in these remarks Wittgenstein often uses the “character” of the names mentioned, the “aroma” and “atmosphere”¹⁶ they evoke, to draw a detailed map of a rich cultural landscape that allows him to locate himself as well as to display 16 Cf. RPP 1980a, § 243; quoted above. The Character of a Name: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare 33 the perspective and the standpoint he adopts when looking at it. It is likely that only persons who belong to Wittgenstein’s cultural circle are able to decipher the character and the specific aroma of the respective names. It seems to me that the finely articulated web of the many cultural references in which Wittgenstein does not further elaborate his take on the poet or composer in question, also serves the purpose of letting an elaborate self-portrait emerge, and at the same time, of providing a key for those readers who are able to recognize the lock. Wittgenstein’s remarks on Shakespeare in particular, I want to suggest, serve precisely this purpose. 3. Shakespeare as a Phenomenon of a Foreign Culture In the quotation with which I opened the present article, Wittgenstein explicitly connects his reaction to Shakespeare to the culture to which the latter belongs: “I think that, in order to enjoy a poet, you have to like the culture to which he belongs as well” (VB 1998, p. 96). Accordingly, when Wittgenstein admits that he does not like Shakespeare, he also intends to say that he does not like the culture to which the latter belongs. With this I do not, of course, want to suggest that his remarks on Shakespeare are a secret message with which Wittgenstein wanted to give expression to his aversion to British culture. Even though von Wright recalls that “in general he [Wittgenstein] was not fond of the English way of life and disliked the academic atmosphere in Cambridge” (von Wright, 2001, p. 16), I think that these problems do not concern specific aspects of the national culture of the UK (as opposed to, say, Austrian, Russian, or French culture), but rather – as the second part of the quotation confirms – a very specific cultural group in which certain forms of behavior are common. Members of this group can be found in different countries and, very likely, in academic circles.¹⁷ After all, Wittgenstein chose to live (and die) in England, and even though he occasionally played with the idea of moving to another country, he always returned there.¹⁸ 17 Here it might be interesting to recall that Wittgenstein was particularly harsh on the academic reception of Shakespeare, on professors who “without understanding & for specious reasons” (VB 1998, p. 55). Wittgenstein expresses a similar judgment also in conversation with Bouwsma; cf. (Bouwsma 1986, p. 72). 18 For these reasons, I think it is wrong (or at least greatly exaggerated and misleading) to attribute Wittgenstein’s views on Shakespeare to his “alienated position as a German-speaking Viennese Jew living in Britain,” as Terrence Hawkes suggests (1988, p. 60). If Wittgenstein felt 34 Wolfgang Huemer I think that with his remarks on Shakespeare, Wittgenstein rather wanted to dissociate himself in particular from the circle of people who admire Shakespeare, who regard him with amazement like a spectacle of nature. They may have lived in the same country and spoken the same language, but their cultural landscapes, their perspectives and their backgrounds were so different that communication or genuine exchange with members of this group became impossible: Wittgenstein, as he repeatedly tells us, simply did not understand them – as he did not understand Shakespeare’s works that create “their own language & world” (VB 1998 p. 89). It is as if – unlike other poets – Shakespeare (and with him his admirers) would speak a different language; one that has its own rules, and a “law of its own” (VB 1998, p. 89); a language that is so foreign to Wittgenstein that he could only hear the sounds , but not penetrate their meaning – as we can hear the songs of birds, but not understand what (if anything) they want to communicate with their singing: “The poet cannot really say of himself ‘I sing as the bird sings’ – but perhaps S. [Shakespeare] could have said it of himself” (VB 1998, p. 96). The fact that Wittgenstein used the name “Shakespeare” and not, say, “Goethe” to make his point – after all, he must have noticed that Goethe is also admired by many who do not understand him, and he surely would have agreed that Goethe, too, is praised by cohorts of professors of literature for specious reasons – shows something about his upbringing and his Austrian background. This background not only means that he was more familiar with the works of Grillparzer, Nestroy, and Goethe than with those of Shakespeare, it also means that he adopted a different historical perspective which made it more difficult for Wittgenstein to open up to the works of Shakespeare. As Marjorie Perloff points out, Wittgenstein’s mistrust was a function of his peculiar Germanic modernity, his lack of understanding for anything as remote as the English Renaissance, which had taken place four centuries earlier. … If the Golden Age for a Modernist English critic was – and probably remains – the “Renaissance,” for a German contemporary of Wittgenstein’s it would no doubt have been the Age of Goethe (Perloff 2012) In addition, Wittgenstein’s mistrust was definitely also a reaction to “the nineteenth-century German cult of Shakespeare as natural genius, a mysterious and anonymous creator, above and beyond the characters he had invented” alienated, this was not due to the fact that when living in Britain he did not live in a Germanspeaking, Viennese, or Jewish environment. Wittgenstein rather felt at home, as I try to show in this article, in the small circle of people who shared some of his views, or ways of seeing things, and who were scattered all over the globe. The Character of a Name: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare 35 (Perloff 2012); a cult that was alien to him. Thus, the worth of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Shakespeare lies in their showing Wittgenstein’s perspective and standpoint and, in consequence, his cultural circle. In this context it might be interesting to recall once again that Wittgenstein does not confront Shakespeare with another poet, but with Beethoven who, as he suggests, is admired by the right kind of persons for the right reasons. Beethoven has a “great heart” (VB 1998, p. 96), through his music one can get in touch with a real human being. And in RPP §243 (quoted above), when talking about the “names of famous poets and composers,” he also mentions the names “Mozart” and “Beethoven” as examples. We will never know whether it is intentional, or purely fortuitous, that he does not provide the name of a poet as an example, but it clearly suggest that music is more present in Wittgenstein’s cultural horizon than literature.¹⁹ It is also worth noting that when Wittgenstein expresses his distance to the circle to which Shakespeare and his admirers belong, he does not express a judgment on the latter, nor does he want to show that his own cultural circle is superior. He merely registers the differences between the two and reports his being suspicious and feeling alien. He does remark that it must be possible to say about this culture that in it “Everything is wrong, things aren’t like that” – when seen from his perspective, applying the criteria familiar to him. But this assertion is biased and cannot have an objective validity because, as he hastens to add, “it is all the same completely right according to a law of its own” (VB 1998, p. 89). Wittgenstein, it seems, is trying to avoid the mistake of describing a foreign culture as hanging on to erroneous views or superstitions; a mistake, that is, that he finds and criticizes in the work of Frazer.²⁰ Of course, Shakespeare’s admirers are not a foreign tribe; after all, they speak – or, at least, seem to speak – the same language, i.e., English. But then, Wittgenstein keeps reminding us that we can make sense of their behavior only by taking into account that they follow rules different from the ones “we,” i.e., all those who partake in Wittgenstein’s cultural 19 The importance of music for Wittgenstein clearly emerges from the numerous references to composers throughout his writings. Moreover, in conversation with Drury he clearly suggests that remarks on music can perform an explanatory function: “It is impossible for me to say in my book [i.e., in the Philosophical Investigations] one word about all that music has meant in my life. How can I hope to be understood?” (Drury 1984, p. 160). Incidentally, right before this quotation Wittgenstein talks about his being foreign: “My way of thinking is not wanted in the present age, I have to swim strongly against the tide.” 20 Take, for example, Wittgenstein’s affirmation on the first page of his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough: “Frazer’s account of the magical and religious views of mankind is unsatisfactory: it makes these views look like errors” (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 119) 36 Wolfgang Huemer circle, follow. By distancing himself from their views, Wittgenstein finds a way of showing ex negativo something about himself and the rules that are in place in the circle where he feels at home. If the considerations I have presented in the last few pages are correct, Wittgenstein’s remarks on Shakespeare are not primarily about Shakespeare, his works or his admirers. When analyzing them in the broader context of his overall Nachlass, we can come to appreciate that they are but a stone in a large mosaic of cultural references that often just play with the “aroma” or “character” that accompanies the names mentioned. This mosaic provides a key for those who recognize the lock and allows them to get a better and more comprehensive picture of Wittgenstein’s cultural background, his mentality, and his intellectual personality. Reconstructing Wittgenstein’s library, in consequence, might provide us a key for a better understanding of the philosopher and his work. Bibliography Biesenbach, Hans (2011): Anspielungen und Zitate im Werk Ludwig Wittgensteins. Bergen: The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB). Bouwsma, O.K. (1986): Wittgenstein: Conversations, 1949–1951. J.L. Craft/Ronald E. Hustwit (Eds). Indianapolis: Hackett. Drury, Maurice O’C. (1984): “Conversations with Wittgenstein”. In: Rush Rhees (Ed.): Recollections of Wittgenstein. 2nd, revised edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 97–171. Hawkes, Terrence (1988): “Wittgenstein’s Shakespeare”. In: Maurice Charney (Ed.): “Bad” Shakespeare: Revolutions of the Shakespearean Canon. London, Toronto: Associated University Presses. Huemer, Wolfgang (2012): “Misreadings: Steiner and Lewis on Wittgenstein on Shakespeare”. In: Philosophy and Literature 36, p. 229–237. Huemer, Wolfgang (2013): “Wittgenstein e la letteratura”. In: Gabriele Tomasi/Elisa Caldarola/ D. Quattrocchi (Eds): Wittgenstein, l’estetica e le arti. Rome: Carocci, p. 227–241. King, John (1984): “Recollections of Wittgenstein”. In: Rush Rhees (Ed.): Recollections of Wittgenstein. 2nd, revised edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 68–75. Klagge, James C. (2011): Wittgenstein in Exile. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lewis, Peter B. (2005): “Wittgenstein, Tolstoy, and Shakespeare”. In: Philosophy and Literature 28, p. 241–55. McGuinness, Brian (1988): Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig, 1889–1921. London: Duckworth. Perloff, Marjorie (2012) “Wittgenstein’s Shakespeare”. Manuscript, to appear in: Wittgenstein Studien 5, no. 4 (2013). Pugh, Jonathan (2012): “Wittgenstein, Shakespeare and Metaphysical Wit”. In: Philosophy and Literature 36, p. 238–248. Steiner, George (1996): “A Reading Against Shakespeare”. In: George Steiner: No Passion Spent. Essays 1970–1995. London: Faber and Faber, p. 108–128. The Character of a Name: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare 37 Stern, David (2001): “Was Wittgenstein a Jew?”. In: James C. Klagge (Ed.): Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 237–272. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1993): Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951. James C. Klagge/Alfred Nordmann (Eds). Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2003): Public and Private Occasions. James C. Klagge/Alfred Nordmann (Eds). Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Wright, G.H. von (2001): Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Oxford: Clarendon Press.