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Considerable Life Extension and Three Views on the Meaning of Life

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 January 2011

MATTI HÄYRY
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Extract

Picture this. You are having your regular medical checkup, when, all of a sudden, the physician turns to you and says: “Oh, did I remember to mention that you can now live forever?” You look at the doctor enquiringly and she goes on: “Well, it’s not actual immortality, you know, but they’ve invented this treatment—I don’t have the full details—that stops aging, getting physically older. It might not be for everyone, but you seem to be a suitable candidate. You could still die of accidents and illness, of course, but they’ve calculated that with care and any luck you should live to be a thousand, as opposed to the hundred or so that you would now have. And in a millennium, techniques will advance further, so there could be more in store for you after that.”

Type
Special Section: Open Forum
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , January 2011 , pp. 21 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

1. Considerable life extension can be examined from many other angles, as well. For a more detailed treatment of the relevant themes, see, e.g., Häyry, M. Rationality and the Genetic Challenge: Making People Better? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010CrossRefGoogle Scholar:chap. 9.

2. De Grey, A. The Mitochondrial Free Radical Theory of Aging. Austin, TX: R. G. Landes Company; 1999Google Scholar; de Grey, A, Rae, M. Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs That Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime. New York: St Martin’s Press; 2007Google Scholar; de Grey, A. Life span extension research and public debate: Societal considerations. Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2007;1; available at http://www.bepress.com/selt/vol1/iss1/art5Google Scholar (last accessed 20 Oct 2010); cf. Häyry, M. Generous funding for interventive aging research now? Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2007;1; available at http://www.bepress.com/selt/vol1/iss1/art13 (last accessed 20 Oct 2010).Google Scholar

3. These are all explained in lay terms at www.sens.org/index.php?pagename=mj_sens_repairing (last accessed 20 Oct 2010). For a more detailed description, see note 2, de Gray, Rae 2007.

4. For a debate on his thoughts, see www.technologyreview.com/sens/ (last accessed 20 Oct 2010).

5. See, e.g., Harris, J. Intimations of immortality: The ethics and justice of life-extending therapies. In: Freeman, MDA, ed. Current Legal Problems 2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003:65–95Google Scholar; Harris, J. Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2007:59–71Google Scholar.

6. See, e.g., Kass, L. Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics. San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books; 2002:257–74Google Scholar; Sandel, M. The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 2007Google Scholar.

7. See, e.g., note 5, Harris 2003 and Harris 2007.

8. See, e.g., note 6, Kass 2002 and Sandel 2007.

9. This view has been explained in more detail by Häyry (see note 1, Häyry 2010, especially chap. 2). It is exemplified by authors and works such as Glover, J. Causing Death and Saving. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books; 1977Google Scholar; Harris, J.The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; 1985Google Scholar; Glover, J.Choosing Children: The Ethical Dilemmas of Genetic Intervention. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2006CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see note 5, Harris 2007.

10. See, e.g., note 6, Kass 2002 and Sandel 2007, and note 1, Häyry 2010:chap. 2.

11. On Epicurus, Epicureanism, and death, see, e.g., Warren, J.Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2004CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12. See note 9, Glover 1977:57.

13. One point that has to be stressed is that the third, Epicurean, model is not cumulative or aggregative in the way that the first is. (This is an issue that has cropped up every time I have presented the ideas of this paper to live audiences.) From the viewpoint of the “more is better” view, it is natural to ask: “If I have found my serenity today and that is good, why is it not better that I live on to experience many more similar days in the future?” The best answer to this question that I can think of (and I do not expect it to convince everyone) is that if, for some reason, the peace of mind that I have so meticulously built all my life and experience today is transitory and cannot be found ever again, then by not dying I would miss my only chance of having a good life, at least in the sense of going out on a high note. If I have been prudential enough not to have a family that would depend on me or unfinished public business that needs my attention, both things that Epicurus warned against as impediments of ataraxia, why would I want to risk that?