Abstract
This article combines a pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation, a sociological conception of legitimacy and a sociological theory of the political field. In particular, it draws on the theorization of the political field developed by Pierre Bourdieu and tries to determine what new insights into the concept of strategic maneuvering might be offered by a sociological analysis of the political field. I analyze a speech made by the President of Romania, Traian Băsescu, following his suspension by Parliament in April 2007. I suggest that the argument developed in this speech can be regarded as an example of adjudication and I discuss its specificity as an adjudication in the political field in an electoral campaign. I also try to relate legitimation as political strategy to strategic maneuvering oriented to meeting the contradictory demands of the political field, which I see—following Bourdieu—as involving a double political game, a game of democratic representation and a game of power.
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Notes
The disadvantages of a purely descriptive view are immediately obvious. Belief in the legitimacy of power can be achieved in various ways, including through ideological propaganda, and people may have reasons for believing that power is legitimate which have nothing to do with the qualities of the system. In addition, it is not in fact even necessary for belief in the legitimacy of a power regime to prevail among a majority of a population in order for that regime to survive unchallenged. It is sufficient for such beliefs to exist among the relevant power elites; most other people will go along with a system of power either through coercion, following perceptions of their own powerlessness or of the ways in which an illegitimate power system serves their own interests, or other reasons which may not involve belief in legitimacy. Furthermore, as Beetham (1991) observes, the view of legitimacy as belief in legitimacy has the unwanted consequence that a totalitarian system of power might be considered legitimate as long as it successfully managed to indoctrinate a sufficient number of the population into believing that it is legitimate.
Problems with normative approaches have been pointed out. One refers to the very possibility of consensus. For some theorists, the search for consensus involves an attempt at universalization, a ‘reduction to consensus’, which tries to level off irreducible differences which should be given recognition instead (Christiano 2004). It is nevertheless possible to preserve the notion of reasonable consensus by viewing it, as Rawls does, as an overlapping consensus. Citizens, that is, do not have to agree on everything but only on those principles that apply to the basic structure of society. A normative approach also seems to presuppose a unique interpretation of what it is reasonable to believe and desire with respect to social and political arrangements. But, if there is reasonable disagreement about the demands of reason itself, i.e., if there are different conceptions of reasonableness, then groups within a community may have different understandings of what is publicly justified within that community, and hence different notions of what institutions might be legitimate for that community (D’Agostino 2007).
Băsescu’s partially implicit argument can be said to go as follows:
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1.1.
I have become involved in the activity of the law, government, secret services, Parliament, education, health etc.
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1.1.′
This involvement is equal to an attempt to modernize Romania, place institutions in the service of the people, etc.
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1.1′.1.
The people believe that institutions should represent their interests, that Romania ought to become a modern state, etc. (L2)
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1.1′.2.
My actions have obeyed the rules of the democratic political game (i.e., representation, etc.) (L1)
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1.
Therefore, my position is legitimate.
His opponents’ argument is the following:
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2.1.
Băsescu has become involved in the activity of the law, government, secret services, Parliament, education, health etc.
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2.1′.
Being thus involved is tantamount to a violation of legitimate prerogatives granted by the Constitution.
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2.1′.1.
The people believe that the Constitution should be respected. (L2)
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2.1′.2.
The President is not observing the Constitution. (L1)
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2.
Therefore, Băsescu’s position is not legitimate.
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1.1.
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Ieţcu-Fairclough, I. Legitimation and Strategic Maneuvering in the Political Field. Argumentation 22, 399–417 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-008-9088-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-008-9088-9