Abstract
In this paper, I examine the comparatively neglected intuition of production regarding causality. I begin by examining the weaknesses of current production accounts of causality. I then distinguish between giving a good production account of causality and a good account of production. I argue that an account of production is needed to make sense of vital practices in causal inference. Finally, I offer an information transmission account of production based on John Collier’s work that solves the primary weaknesses of current production accounts: applicability and absences.
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Notes
Other elements of production have been discussed by various philosophers. For Hall (2004), the core of production is transitivity, locality and intrinsicness. Many philosophers seek the Humean secret connexion: oomph, biff or glue. We might add singularism, as a core concern of Glennan’s, although some difference-making accounts are also singularist, such as counterfactual dependence. Others are concerned with realism—production as the thing in the world Dowe (2004). I suggest we let the needs of causal inference guide us in forming an account of production and see whether any of these traditional elements of production are satisfied afterwards. I will not address them further in this paper.
This suggests a univocal account of causality. As I have said, I am here interested only in an account of production and will reserve for further work the examination of whether this account can be extended to do the jobs of difference-making accounts.
These are developments that Collier is highly sympathetic to (private communication).
I have given a unified account of production in terms of information. If the notion of information splinters, I will lose the unity I set out to achieve. I intend to address this by using work by Floridi that multiple notions of information are related, with some more fundamental than others. See Floridi (2010, 2009). I reserve this for future work.
There is an interesting possibility that this view will offer a univocal account of causality. Information transmission deals well with production, and mechanistic hierarchy offers the possibility of solving the problems of context and relevance. It is well-known that mechanisms set the context for causal claims. They also point you to the relevant properties—properties that make a difference to various effects of interest. If accounts of these can be given in informational terms, this will yield a univocal account of causality. If accounts of these require extra work, brought in from the mechanisms literature, that cannot be incorporated in the informational account, then the resulting account will still show how production and difference making integrate, while remaining conceptually distinct. Either way, the view will be fruitful. I reserve this possibility for future work.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for funding this work on mechanisms. I am also grateful to numerous colleagues and two anonymous referees for extensive discussions leading to improvement of the work. These colleagues include, but are not limited to: John Collier, Luciano Floridi, James Ladyman, Bert Leuridan, Federica Russo, Erik Weber and Jon Williamson. Remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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Illari, P.M. Why Theories of Causality Need Production: an Information Transmission Account. Philos. Technol. 24, 95–114 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-010-0006-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-010-0006-3