Abstract
According to a renowned left-libertarian, Michael Otsuka, a libertarian right of self-ownership can be so robust that one need not sacrifice the use of one's mind and body to help others. In this article, I demonstrate that Otsuka's way of reconciling this robust conception of self-ownership with equality is not appealing and, at best, would provide limited guidance in the face of real-life uncertainty.
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Acknowledgements
A version of this paper was presented at the Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Manchester, July 2005. I am grateful to all in the audience, especially Hillel Steiner. I would like to thank the Australian Government for funding my Australian-Asia Award, as well as the Philosophy Program (SPT Group), Australian National University, and the Aristotelian Society for financial support. I am also indebted to Geoff Brenann, Bob Goodin, Nien-hê Hsieh, and Mike Otsuka for their helpful comments. Research for this article was supported by the JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research.
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Inoue, A. Can a right of self-ownership be robust?. Law and Philos 26, 575–587 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-006-9006-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-006-9006-y