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Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” Minimal rationality

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Abstract

An argument is advanced to show why E-admissibility should be preferred over maximality as a principle of rational choice where rationality is understood as minimal rationality. Consideration is given to the distinction between second best and second worst options in three way choice that is ignored according to maximality. It is shown why the behavior exhibited in addressing the problems posed by Allais (Econometrica 21:503–546, 1952) and by Ellsberg (Q Econ 75:643–669, 1961) do not violate the independence postulate according to minimal rationality.

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  1. 25 Claremont Avenue, New York, NY, 10027, USA

    Isaac Levi

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  1. Isaac Levi
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Correspondence to Isaac Levi.

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Levi, I. Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” Minimal rationality. Mind & Society 5, 199–211 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-006-0017-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-006-0017-z

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