Abstract
Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, argue that such contents are best construed in terms of mind-dependent properties. Other representationalists, including Tye and Dretske, hold that these contents involve only mind-independent properties. Susanna Schellenberg has recently developed an account of perceptual experience that would serve these latter representationalists extremely well. She suggests that we can do justice to the perspectival character of perceptual experience by appeal to representations of a certain type of relational properties, so-called ‘situation-dependent properties.’ In this paper, I critically engage with Schellenberg’s proposal in order to show how mind-independent representationalists can explain perspectival character. I argue that appeal to situation-dependent properties is problematic. I then show that mind-independent representationalists can account for perspectical character by means of scenario contents in Christopher Peacocke’s sense.
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Notes
I intend this as a pre-theoretical description of perspectival character. It may seem natural to describe perspectival changes as follows: you see the same size and shape throughout changes in perspective, but the way the size and the shape look changes. I do not use this formulation here because I do not think that size and shape properties can look different.
This explanation does not hold for all versions of the sense datum theory. For example, Jackson (1977) has argued that sense data are located at the surfaces of objects. As a consequence, they do not change with the perceiver’s point of view.
The term ‘phenomenal character’ refers to what it is like for a perceiver to undergo a given experience.
See, for example, chapter 4 in Tye (2000).
Note, however, that Schellenberg does not claim that all aspects of an experience’s phenomenal character supervene on some kind of representational content.
Some caution is required here, however. One might point to the theory of relativity and argue that size and shape are not intrinsic properties because they depend both on the structure of the gravitational field and the state of motion of an observer. Yet, for the present purpose, I will ignore this because for observers like us in gravitational fields like ours such effects are extremely small.
We can formulate this proposal more formally by appeal to the following definition of a relational property: F is a relational property of object o, if there is a relation R, and an item i, such that o’s having F consists in o’s bearing R to i (Francescotti 1999, 591). In the case of situation-dependent properties, the relevant objects are the visible surfaces in the perceiver’s environment, and the relations are the spatial relations of these surfaces to the perceiver’s viewpoint. Let us say that s is a visible surface in the perceiver’s environment. We can then state Schellenberg’s proposal as follows: S is a situation-dependent property of s, if there is a viewpoint v and a spatial relation D (determined by its distance from and orientation to v), such that s’s instantiating S consists in s’s bearing D to v.
Peacocke introduces scenarios in order to specify the correctness conditions of so-called ‘scenario contents.’ I will describe the relationship between these two notions in a bit more detail in Sect. 4 of this paper.
Peacocke’s example has received much attention in the literature. For a summary and illuminating discussion, see Millar (2010).
Peacocke defines sensational properties as follows: “The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content)” (Peacocke 2008, 7).
A visual angle is the angle between the lines of sight leading from the point of view to the edges of the object. Like viewpoint-relative sizes, visual angles are relational properties. They depend on an object’s intrinsic size and its relation to the perceiver. I think, however, that there is a clear sense in which visual angles can be represented as monadic properties.
For this and other examples, see Shoemaker (1994). Note, however, that the situation is more complex. Weight is also a relational property instantiated in an object in virtue of its mass and the respective gravitational field. It follows that being heavy is actually a relational property between three relata. An object is heavy in virtue of its mass, the strength of the person who lifts it, and the respective gravitational field.
This view could be developed further in two different ways. On the one hand, the representationalist could argue that both situation-dependent and intrinsic properties are visually represented in experience. This is Schellenberg’s view. On the other hand, the representationalist could argue that only the former are visually represented in experience. Intrinsic properties, in contrast, are represented at the level of perceptual judgment.
For simplicity, I will ignore other relations to your point of view, such as the tree’s orientation and its direction.
In mathematical terms, there is an onto-function from distance and size to visual angles. If we say that V is the visual angle, D the distance between the object and the perceiver’s point of view and S the intrinsic size of the object, we can express this function by means of the following equation: V = 2arctan(S/2D).
In mathematical terms, these visual angles form an equivalence class. The equivalence function determining this class is the mirror image of the function specified in the previous footnote.
One may, of course, reject this notion of representation and thus reject Schellenberg’s proposal even for size properties.
One such option has recently been developed in Brogaard (2009). Brogaard suggests that we construe situation-dependent properties as centered properties. Centered properties are functions from centered worlds to extensions. Whether an object instantiates a centered property will depend, for example, on where the perceiver is spatio-temporally located.
There are a number of ways in which representationalists have defined the respective mind-dependent aspects of perceptual experience. Perhaps the most well-known attempts stem from Shoemaker and Lycan. According to Shoemaker (1994), perceptual experiences represent appearance properties, which he defines as dispositions to cause experiences with a certain quality. Given this, one could account for the perspectival character of perceptual experience as follows. Two experiences of the same shape from different points of view differ phenomenally because they represent different appearance properties, and by representing these properties, they represent different situation-dependent shape properties. According to Lycan (1996), in contrast, perceptual experiences represent certain kinds of intentional objects, namely colored shapes. Given this, one could try to explain perspectival character by saying that two experiences of the same shape from different points of view differ phenomenally because they represent different colored shapes, and by representing these colored shapes, they represent different situation-dependent properties. In fact, Lycan proposes this in part in order to account for Peacocke’s trees.
As we have seen, mind-independent versions of this strategy have been defended by Tye and Schellenberg, who distinguish between intrinsic properties on the one hand and relational or situation-dependent properties on the other. Brogaard’s proposal also falls into this category. She distinguishes between centered and uncentered properties. See footnote 22. As I have also mentioned, one possible mind-dependent version of this strategy has been defended by Shoemaker who distinguishes between intrinsic properties and appearance properties.
As we have seen, Lycan accounts for appearances by appeal to intentional objects, namely colored shapes. According to Lycan, these contents are illusory. See Lycan (1996).
I will consider this claim shortly. I will argue that the phenomenology of perceptual experience strongly suggests that apparent shape properties, if they were indeed part of the visual experience, would have to be located at the surfaces of visual objects.
The view that relative distance is represented in experience (at least in veridical experiences) has been expressed, for example, in Lycan (1996), Tye (2000), and Dretske (2003). Schellenberg (2008) argues that perceptual experience typically does not represent relative distance. According to her, this is cognitively too demanding. I think that this is not phenomenologically correct, at least not for the types of experiences under consideration. Moreover, it is typical to define the task of the visual system as recovering intrinsic sizes and shapes from the information contained in the proximal stimulus. This requires that the visual system represents information about the distances of objects from the perceiver’s point of view. But if the visual system computes such information, it cannot be true that this is cognitively too demanding. Further, if distance information is represented at the level of subpersonal computational processes, there is no principal reason for why this information should not enter into the phenomenal content of the experience.
For arguments against the phenomenal adequacy of a two-dimensional visual field, see Siewert (1998).
This point has also been made by Siewert (2006). He considers the case of a coin. Suppose you turn a coin from a position perpendicular to your line of sight to a position where it looks flat. If you would not experience the coin as changing position, you would experience its edge as becoming flat. In other words, you would experience the coin as changing shape.
See also my comments about scenario contents in the next section.
Strictly speaking this holds true only on the assumption that visual space has a Euclidean structure. Some vision scientists have argued that visual space has a non-Euclidean metric with a negative curvature. A classical study can be found in Luneburg (1947). For recent experiments, see Koenderink et al. (2000). But, even if this is correct, the curvature of visual space is not sufficient to explain perspectival character.
An experience has nonconceptual content if the subject need not possess the concepts necessary to specify what that content is.
Peacocke gives the following example to illustrate the fact that perceptual experiences represent directions: “Looking straight ahead at Buckingham Palace is one experience. It is another to look at the palace with one’s face still toward it but with one’s body turned towards the right. In this second case the palace is experienced as being off to one right from the direction of straight ahead, even if the view remains exactly the same as in the first case” (Peacocke 1992, 62).
Geometric features have no causal powers. One might argue therefore that it is not possible to give a naturalistic account of representations of these features. Since one of the main motivations behind mind-independent representationalism is to naturalize consciousness, this is a potential problem. But there is a solution to this problem. Visual scenes contain visual angles as physical properties and visual information is conveyed through light. Since light rays travel in straight lines, the rays reaching an observer’s eyes from the edges of objects form visual angles. Accordingly, visual angles are real physical features of the situation of observation. Now, we do not see light rays. I therefore suggest that experiences represent visual angles not as physical but rather as geometric properties of the scene around the perceiver. The importance of visual angles was emphasized in vision research most notably by Gibson (1979).
The following passage by Dretske expresses this very well: “If things are working right, these objects [Peacocke’s trees] are also represented as being different distances from me and, therefore, as a matter of geometry, as necessarily subtending different angles and (what amounts to the same thing) as occupying different areas in my visual field. These, however, are all properties the trees are represented as having, not (as in picture of trees) properties of those objects (splotches of pigment on the picture surface) that represent trees” (Dretske 2003, 79).
At the end of Sect. 2, I said that I do not think that one can reject the phenomenological datum that there is a sense in which objects look different from different points of view. It should now be clear why I think this to be the case. There is a phenomenal difference because the edges forming the object’s shape subtend different visual angles.
The view that a rectangular object seen from an angle looks rectangular in the phenomenal sense of the word has been defended by sense datum theorists like Russell (1912) and Ayer (1955), but also by representationalists like Tye (2000). Recently, this view has also been forcefully articulated by Noë (2004). For critiques of this phenomenological datum, see Austin (1962) and, more recently, Schwitzgebel (2006). Some authors have argued that an observer is not usually aware of a trapezoidal shape, but can become aware of it, if she takes on a painterly attitude. For this view, see Merleau-Ponty (1962) and, more recently, Kelly (2005).
For a recent defense of this view, see Noë (2004).
Famously, this view has been defended by Austin (1962).
As I have already mentioned, this is the position of some sense datum theorists like Russell and Ayer.
Note, however, that I will not judge that the coin’s shape changes. In this sense, my judgment is not completely determined by the phenomenology of my visual experience.
Schellenberg distinguishes between an epistemological and a scientific analysis of the visual process. She is concerned with the former, but does not think that this is in conflict with the latter. She writes: “Now, it is empirically well-established that the process of bringing about representations of situation-dependent properties and intrinsic properties are mutually dependent in the human visual system insofar as information about situation-dependent properties is used to gain information about intrinsic properties and vice versa. Acknowledging this fact is compatible with accepting the epistemic dependency thesis insofar as the epistemic dependence between the two representations is independent of the process by which these representations are brought about” (Schellenberg 2008, 79). In the following, I will also be concerned with an epistemological analysis.
For a description of a similar gestalt switch, see Kelly (2005).
Compare this to the experience of the duck/rabbit figure. When your experience switches from that of a duck to that of a rabbit, you see the various parts of the figure as parts of a different animal. For example, you see the protruding part of the figure first as a part of the duck, namely as its beak, and then as a part of the rabbit, namely as its ears.
Tye, for example, is aware of this in the context of his own proposal. See Tye (2000, 61).
Note that this does not imply that creatures that do not possess appropriate concepts can experience spatial gestalt switches.
We can distinguish between more general concepts of three-dimensional shapes (e.g., voluminous figure) and more specific concepts (e.g., cube-shaped). Accordingly, what one perceives will depend on one’s conceptual sophistication. This proposal is consistent with the view on nonconceptual content defended by Raftopulos and Müller. They hold that the early visual system produces a nonconceptual representation with a scenario content that is independent of the perceiver’s higher-level conceptual capacities. The perception of three-dimensional shapes is the result of the application of higher-order conceptual capacities on the nonconceptual content. See Raftopoulos and Müller (2006) and Raftopoulos (2009).
For an argument to this effect, see Macpherson (2006).
This proposal is inspired by Schellenberg’s own argument for the epistemic dependency of representations of intrinsic properties on representations of situation-dependent properties. See Schellenberg (2008). I want to emphasize, however, that my proposal differs from hers in important ways.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful for comments by Beth Preston, who read an earlier draft of this paper. I presented a version of this paper at the annual meeting of the central division of the APA in 2010 and am grateful to Robert Schroer for his very helpful comments. Finally, I want to thank two anonymous reviewers for this journal. Their comments proved extremely valuable and helped me to improve the argument.
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Jagnow, R. Representationalism and the perspectival character of perceptual experience. Philos Stud 157, 227–249 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9634-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9634-9