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Representing as Adapting

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Abstract

In this paper, I recommend a creature-level theory of representing. On this theory, a creature (basically) represents some entity just in case the creature adapts its behavior to that entity. Adapting is analyzed in terms of establishing new patterns of behavior. The theory of representing as adapting is contrasted with traditional causal and informational theories of mental representation. Moreover, I examine the theory in light of Putnam-Burge style externalism; I show that Putnam-Burge style externalism follows from and is explained by it. I also suggest that the theory of representing as adapting easily accommodates a significant causal-explanatory role for (wide) representational content.

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Notes

  1. My concern will be an accounting for a (successful) representing relation between subjects and existing entities. Famously, there are apparent cases of representing when there is nothing to represent. For some discussion, see Smith (2002). My concern is not with these problematic cases. In my view, this latter kind of (apparent) representing is to be understood in terms of the former kind of successful (relational) representing.

  2. I am not sympathetic to biological theories of representation as described by Neander (2007).

  3. There is, of course, a distinction between behavior that is, in fact, advantageous and behavior that is normally advantageous but may not in fact be advantageous due to unusual circumstances. Generally, I have in mind the latter, but I will suppress the “normally” henceforth.

  4. The standard approach is very diverse. It includes informational theories—e.g., Dretske (1981), Fodor (1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2008)—teleological theories—e.g., Millikan (1984, 1993, 2004), Papineau (1987), Dretske (1988)—representationalist conceptual role theories—e.g., Peacocke (1992, 1998), Wedgwood (2006, 2007)—and deflationary theories—e.g., Field (2001), Horwich (1998, 2005), Hill (2002, 2010). Even theorists such as Stalnaker (1984) who are skeptical of Mentalese seem to focus on what states of creatures represent rather than what the creatures themselves represent.

  5. This is a version of the “disjunction problem.” For discussion, see Cummins (1991), Fodor (1990), and Prinz (2004), ch. 9.

  6. Some progress might be made by introducing an asymmetrical dependence condition. Cf. Fodor (1990). Of course, some problems remain. Cf. Loewer and Rey (1991).

  7. For instance, it motivates both the teleological and deflationary theories of representation mentioned in fn 4.

  8. A clear proponent of mere supervenience is Horwich (1998, 2005), but arguably, Davidson (1984) and Lewis (1984) are also committed to this approach.

  9. So, in a sense, I’m taking a position that diametrically opposes Field’s (2001), ch. 4–5, “methodological deflationism.”

  10. For a defense of the latter, see Millikan (1993), ch. 4.

  11. As Chalmers (2012) puts it, the term “Barack Obama” is Twin Earthable while “12” isn’t.

  12. This appears to be the case not only for informational theories of representation (cited in fn. 4), but also teleological theories of representation that take information as a starting point (also cited in fn. 4).

  13. The significance of making the distinction between the personal and sub-personal level is advocated by, for instance, Rowlands (1997).

  14. Note that it would be easy enough to explain why the creature might find the search target by citing the narrow mechanisms at work in implementing the underlying procedure as outlined in (1)–(4) along with the environmental conditions that ordinarily obtain when these mechanisms are at work—thereby allocating the causal-explanatory power primarily to narrow features of the creature’s psychology. The explanatory role of the search target itself seems minimal at best.

  15. I am not primarily interested in Burge’s (2010) exegesis. However, the following quote on p. 399 is suggestive: “Perception [and objectification] requires systematic transformations from sensory registrations to representational states that are distinctive to specific to [sic] environmental conditions.”

  16. Of course, Lewis (1986) seems to take an opposing position.

  17. I’m interested in something more like Jackson and Pettit’s (1988, 1990) causal relevance rather than causal power, per se. I am not here concerned with the causal efficacy of the mental as discussed in Kim (1993, 2005).

  18. The screening off issue in question concerns the causal relevance of intrinsic versus extrinsic properties of the mind. This issue should be distinguished from Jaegwon Kim’s problem of explanatory exclusion as elucidated in Kim (1993, 2005). Kim’s problem concerns the causal efficacy of properties that do not reduce to physical properties. Dretske (1988) was not quite so clear about the way that he put his worry—as subsequent exchanges between Dretske and Kim verify. See their contributions in Villanueva (1990) and McLaughlin (1991).

  19. This suggestion is related to the claim developed in Dretske (1988) and Millikan (1993), chs. 7–8, that behavior itself is wide.

  20. While I agree, it is not because I find Peacocke’s (1993) defense of the causal-explanatory role of wide representational content especially convincing. I don’t think he successfully shows that that the explanation of these relational properties can’t be factored into an individualistic explanation of mental activity, and a recitation of the distal conditions that ordinarily obtain when this kind of mental activity takes place.

  21. For some considerations in favor of this historicalism, see Adams and Aizawa (1997). It is notable that, in distinguishing their own version of externalism, Clark and Chalmers (1998) go so far as to characterize Putnam-Burge externalism as bringing in causal history. One way of incorporating history involves moving to a teleological account (for examples, see the works cited in fn 4)—see Dretske (2000). However, a teleological account is neither necessary, nor sufficient for incorporating history.

  22. Causal engagement takes time, so being presently causally engaged will ordinarily involve having a history with the entity in question, but what matters, in my opinion, is present causal engagement, not history. Certainly, an evolutionary history would seem to be irrelevant to causal engagement of the relevant sort.

  23. In effect, I am helping myself to Burge’s (2010) distinction between reference and indication/attribution. I conceive of representing o as F as referring to o and attributing F to it—in Burge’s (2010) sense.

  24. I think what makes human beings different from most other animals is probably not just that they adapt to kinds, but that the range of objects and kinds they can adapt to is unbounded. This is at least partly to do with non-basic representation.

  25. McKitrick (2003) defends “extrinsic” dispositions.

  26. For recent essays on the more traditional teleological approach to representation, see Macdonald and Papineau (2006). Of course, as Papineau (1987) notes, teleological approaches need not be historical (as is traditional). For some discussion, see Bauer (2009), Lewens (2007), and Schroeder (2004). For recent essays on normative approaches to representation, see Dretske (2000), Glüer and Wikforss (2009), Hattiangadi (2006), Steglich-Petersen (2008), Wedgwood (2007), and Zangwill (2005, 2010).

  27. For more on varieties of functionalism, see Kim (1996) and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007).

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to David Chalmers, Richard Heck, and Christopher Hill for prompting me—in different ways—to think more carefully about mind-world semantic relations. This paper has also benefitted from conversations with Tom Cochrane and feedback from Katherine Rubin. I gave presentations on closely related topics at the University of Waterloo, Trinity College Dublin, Queen’s University Belfast, and San Francisco State University. Thanks to those audiences.

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Jarvis, B. Representing as Adapting. Acta Anal 30, 17–39 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-014-0229-5

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