Abstract
Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.
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Notes
This is not Parfit’s own position. (Unlike many writers, Heathwood does not say that it is.) In personal communication, Parfit has told me that he regards temporal neutrality as the most rational attitude, and that the claims he made in Reasons and Persons which may appear to defend the rationality of our bias towards the future are merely parts of a dialectic.
Heathwood raises a similar worry about a different suggestion (2008: 66–67).
FA3 x is intrinsically good for S at time t to degree n iff x itself gives S reason at t of strength n to intrinsically desire x at t for S’s sake;
x is intrinsically bad for S at time t to degree n iff x itself gives S reason at t of strength n to be intrinsically averse to x at t for S’s sake. (2008: 62–63).
In addition to the “atemporality” objection to be discussed shortly, Heathwood points out that, since Parfit’s future suffering gives him reason now to be intrinsically averse to it now for his own sake, FA3-friends are committed to the implausible claim that Parfit’s future suffering is intrinsically bad for him now. Notice that FA1a, with its clause “x occurs at t,” implies no such thing.
FA4 x is intrinsically good for S to degree n iff x itself gives S reason of strength n to intrinsically desire x before or during the time at which x occurs for S’s sake;
x is intrinsically bad for S to degree n iff x itself gives S reason of strength n to be intrinsically averse to x before or during the time at which x occurs for S’s sake. (2008: 65)
Yet another response to the “intrinsic prevital/posthumous harms” challenge might be to drop the requirement that x should give S the relevant reason. Other people may have reason to be intrinsically averse to x for S’s sake at a time at which S does not exist. But this move sacrifices the abovementioned point about the wicked person (see sect. 2).
Some so-called “A-theorists” might take being past to be an intrinsic feature of Parfit’s pain. However, it would be a serious drawback for Heathwood’s argument if it had to rely on that highly questionable minority view.
The point can be reinforced if we consider the fact that the fitting-attitudes account of value simpliciter is often stated in terms of the reasons that the properties of the valuable thing provide—rather than the reasons that the thing itself provides—for certain attitudes to it. Arguably, a corresponding analysis of “x is intrinsically bad for S” would—again, assuming that intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic features—appeal to the reasons that x’s intrinsic properties give S for being intrinsically averse to x for S’s sake. It would be strange to say that such reasons depend on x’s extrinsic properties.
Indeed, Parfit’s past, 10-h long pain gives him much more reason to be intrinsically averse to it than his future, 1-h long pain would have given him to be intrinsically averse to it. (Recall the complication about degrees mentioned in sect. 3.) Again, though, his future pain might give him much more reason for overall aversion than his past pain does.
More exactly, FA2, which friends of FA1 should accept (see sect. 3).
References
Heathwood C (2008) Fitting Attitudes and Welfare. Oxf Stud Metaethics 3:47–73
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Krister Bykvist, Tom Douglas, Chris Heathwood, Guy Kahane, Matthew Liao, James Morauta, Jonas Olson, Derek Parfit, Janet Radcliffe Richards, Julian Savulescu, and two anonymous referees.
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Johansson, J. Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 12, 247–256 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9161-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9161-y